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ABSTRACT 
Created in response to findings of the 9/11 Commission concerning the 
lack of information sharing as a primary factor in the failure to stop the 
September 11, 2001, attacks, the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was 
mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA).  The ISE was intended to build on existing information sharing systems 
and promote increased information sharing through the creation of a 
collaborative culture among a diverse group of participants.  Another goal of the 
ISE is to protect information privacy. 
ISE efforts to meet the goal of information privacy protection are stymied 
by a lack of uniform privacy standards that are equally applicable to all ISE 
participants.  The thesis compares two policy options—voluntarily adopted 
mandatory standards and federally imposed mandatory standards—to the status 
quo system of voluntary guidelines.  These policy options are evaluated in terms 
of their effect on collaboration and information sharing, their constitutionality, their 
consistency and enforceability in application, and political acceptability.  Based 
on projected relative outcomes, this thesis recommends that the ISE adopt a 
privacy protection system consisting of voluntary standards that, once adopted, 
become mandatory in application. 
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With proper planning we can have both enhanced privacy 
protections and increased information sharing—and in fact, we 
must achieve this balance at all levels of government, in order to 
maintain the trust of the American people. 
National Strategy for Information Sharing (2007), p. 27. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Created in response to findings of the 9/11 Commission concerning the 
lack of information sharing as a primary factor in the failure to stop the 
September 11, 2001, attacks, the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was 
mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA).  The ISE was intended to build on existing information sharing systems 
and promote increased information sharing through the creation of a 
collaborative culture among a diverse group of “federal departments and 
agencies and state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and foreign 
partners” (Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment [PM-ISE], n.d.).  
One of the five stated goals of the ISE is to “ensure sharing procedures and 
policies and protect information privacy and civil liberties” (PM-ISE, n.d.).   
ISE efforts to meet the goal of information privacy protection are stymied, 
in part, by a lack of settled law in this area (exacerbated by a paucity of Supreme 
Court cases that fail to address immense changes in information technology in 
the three decades since they were decided), and a hodgepodge of federal and 
state laws that do not provide uniform privacy protection.   
Furthermore, other than supplying very general guidelines to the ISE, 
there has been little action taken by the ISE program manager to remedy this 
gap in privacy protection.  The PM-ISE guidelines identify privacy issues and 
provide assistance with preparing privacy protection policies but, in practice, do 
not mandate any particular privacy protections; in fact, “privacy” is not even 
defined in the guidelines (PM-ISE, n.d.).  Participation in the ISE is not 
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conditioned upon compliance with the PM-ISE guidelines.  Instead, privacy 
protection standards are promulgated by each ISE participant, leading to 
inconsistencies in protection. Moreover, despite a pronouncement that the 
private sector and foreign partners are an important part of the ISE, those sectors 
are rarely mentioned in the PM-ISE guidelines, much less the subject of any 
regulation or control. 
Besides the apparent deleterious effects on privacy itself, the lack of 
uniform standards may actually work against the creation of a collaborative 
information sharing environment.  For example, some participants in the ISE may 
be less likely to share information if they cannot ensure that the recipient of that 
information has adequate privacy protections in place (Stimson, 2008).  
Violations of privacy rights through improper dissemination of personal 
information can also lead to decreased support for counterterrorism efforts 
(National Research Council, 2008).   
Although information concerning specific instances of privacy issues in the 
ISE is not readily available, the existence of the issue was recognized in a recent 
report by the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the 
Information Age (2009).  The Markle report detailed the steps the group believes 
the Obama administration should take to improve information sharing that, in its 
view, remains inadequate (Markle Foundation, 2009).  Included in the report is a 
discussion of the need for an effective framework for information sharing, 
including “government-wide policy guidelines and oversight to provide robust 
protections for privacy and civil liberties” (Markle Foundation, 2009, p. 7).  The 
report goes on to discuss the problems that could arise in the absence of those 
protections: 
Without those privacy protections in place, the American people 
won’t have confidence in their government, while the analysts and 
operatives using the information sharing framework won’t have 
confidence that they know what they are expected and allowed to 
do, and that their work is lawful and appropriate.(Markle 
Foundation, 2009, p. 2) 
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The need to address privacy concerns is becoming more acute.  The 
National Research Council (2008) found that over time “the public is growing less 
certain of the need to sacrifice civil liberties for terrorism prevention, less willing 
to make such sacrifices, and more concerned that government counterterrorism 
efforts will erode privacy” (p. 283). Furthermore, “trust in government is 
negatively associated with affirmation of civil rights:  those with greater trust in 
government are more willing to sacrifice freedoms, compared with those with less 
trust” (National Research Council, 2008, p. 321). However, the National 
Resource Council (2008) found that threat perception, among other 
considerations, also impacts the public’s balancing of civil liberty protections and 
counterterrorism efforts. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is there a need for a new conception of information privacy law for 
application in the Information Sharing Environment, and, if so, which policy 
options to apply this new concept would most effectively protect privacy rights 
while promoting increased information sharing and creating a collaborative 
environment among the wide variety of ISE participants?   
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research is intended to be of interest to the homeland security 
academic and legal communities by proposing a new conceptual framework for 
information privacy law.  The immediate consumers of this research, however, 
are the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment all ISE 
members from the federal, state, local, and tribal governments.  In addition, this 
research identifies new privacy protection policy options for consideration by 
policymakers and homeland security practitioners and, given the paucity of 
literature in this policy area, ideally would form the basis for future debate and 
research.  In summary, by ensuring the uniform and mandatory application 
privacy protection standards for all members of the ISE, homeland security can 
be improved and individual rights and liberties can be protected.   
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review concerns (1) the jurisprudential basis for the concept 
of information privacy; (2) existing federal privacy statutes; and (3) selected 
general approaches to protecting information privacy rights. 
1. Jurisprudential Basis for the Concept of Information Privacy   
Closely related to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the right of privacy is judicially recognized as a 
fundamental right protected by the Constitution (Richards, 2006).  Although the 
two protections are related, the right of privacy and the Fourth Amendment are 
not coterminous.   
In addition to its relationship to the Fourth Amendment, the right of privacy 
arises from several other constitutional provisions—namely, the First Amendment 
(freedom of speech), the Third Amendment (peacetime quartering of soldiers), 
the Fifth Amendment (privilege against self-incrimination), the Ninth Amendment 
(preservation of rights not specifically enumerated) and the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Due Process Clause) (Kramer, 2007).   
Commonly divided into distinctive constituent parts, the general law of 
privacy encompasses (1) "informational privacy," which concerns the 
"dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information," and (2) 
"autonomy privacy," which deals with "making intimate personal decisions or 
conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference" 
(Kramer, 2007, §§ 603, 604).  In essence, then, the right of privacy can be 
thought of as the right to be left alone (autonomy privacy) and the right to keep 
personal information personal (information privacy).  
Information privacy—the part of privacy implicated by the ISE—is further 
subdivided into areas concerning the collection and storage of personal 
information by the government, on one hand, and the public release of that 
information on the other hand (Kramer, 2007).  In contrast to other rights, 
including the right of autonomy privacy, information privacy has not often been 
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considered by the courts.  Two of the primary Supreme Court cases dealing with 
information privacy focused on the role of the Fourth Amendment—to the 
exclusion of other bases for the right of privacy—in concluding that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records (U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 
(1976)) or dialed phone numbers (Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 779 (1979)) 
because in both cases the information at issue was voluntarily given to third 
parties.  In a third case from the 1970s, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the 
court expressly distinguished information privacy from autonomy privacy. 
These Supreme Court precedents, in effect, treat information privacy as 
an on-off switch.  Information is either entirely private or entirely public—with 
either full protection or virtually no protection, respectively. With limited 
exceptions for privileged communications, such as the attorney-client privilege, 
once information is communicated to a third party there ceases to be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.   
The constitutionality of a New York state statute requiring the identification 
of patients who obtained certain controlled prescription drugs was the subject of 
Whalen.  In upholding the state statute, the Supreme Court expressly stated its 
view that privacy, as a concept, actually involves two different kinds of interests.  
The first involves decisional privacy, the “interest in making certain kinds of 
important decisions,” and second pertains to informational privacy, defined as 
“the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” (429 U.S. at 
599).   
In dicta—a non-dispositive opinion of a court—the court discussed “the 
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal 
information in computerized data banks or other massive government files”  (429 
U.S. at 605).  However, the court recognized that certain government functions, 
such as law enforcement, “require the orderly preservation of great quantities of 




if disclosed” but that the “right to collect and use such data for public purposes is 
typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures” (429 U.S. at 605). 
In Miller, the federal government appealed a Court of Appeals ruling that 
Miller’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure were 
violated when the government required a third-party bank to copy all of the 
Miller’s personal checks. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals 
and held that Miller did not have a protected Fourth Amendment interest in 
copies of his personal checks. 
Distinguishing the current case from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 
(1886), the Supreme Court held that, unlike Boyd, where “private papers” were 
found to be protected against compulsory production, the papers in the Miller 
case were not private, even though Miller claimed that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the check copies.  In so holding, the court stated that it 
had  
held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by 
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed 
on the assumption that it will only be used for a limited purpose and 
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. (Miller, 
425 U.S. at 443) 
Smith involved a criminal case in which a pen register, used to record 
phone numbers dialed, was installed on Smith’s telephone line by a phone 
company at the request of the police.  Smith claimed that the use of the pen 
register, installed without a warrant. improperly infringed on his reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  The “reasonable expectation of privacy,” as the Supreme 
Court explained by reference to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
depends “on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a 
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by 
government action” (Smith, 442 U.S. at 740) [internal cites omitted].  Thus, as the 
court continued, a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis requires an 
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examination of two questions.  First, has an actual, subjective expectation of 
privacy, as evidenced by conduct, been exhibited?  Second, is society willing to 
recognize that subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable?  Both questions 
must be answered in the affirmative for there to be a finding of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
In applying these questions to the case at hand, the Court held that Smith, 
and telephone users as a whole, do not “harbor any general expectation that the 
numbers they dial will remain secret” Smith, (442 U.S. at 743).  Although the 
analysis could have ended there, the Court went on to hold that even if Smith 
had had a subjective expectation of privacy, such an expectation would not be 
one that society would find to be reasonable, stating that the Court “consistently 
has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties” (Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-744) [internal cites omitted]. 
Subsequently, Congress passed legislation to statutorily supersede these 
two cases.  In response to Miller, the Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. § 
3401 et seq. (1978)), was enacted to allow individuals to challenge administrative 
subpoenas of financial records in court.  Smith, in turn, was superseded by 18 
U.S.C. § 3121(a) (1989), which prohibited use of pen registers without a warrant. 
Nonetheless, the underlying holding in both Miller and Smith—that there is 
no reasonable expectation in information voluntarily given to third parties—still 
stands notwithstanding the subsequent legislation.  In Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735 (1984), third-party subpoenas 
issued under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
were upheld as constitutional.  The court, citing Miller, reiterated the principle that 
it is “established that, when a person communicates information to a third party 
even on the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot 
object if the third party conveys that information or records thereof to law 
enforcement authorities”  (467 U.S. at 743). 
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Despite these Supreme Court cases, information privacy law remains 
unsettled many years later.  Legal scholars continue to debate the nature of the 
right itself (Richards, 2006).  Should exposure of information to others retain its 
private character? Does it matter whether the exposure was accidental or 
intentional? Does intentional release of information in a limited fashion eliminate 
the right as to further release to others? Does the right protect the confidentiality 
of relationships? These are but a sampling of the issues currently being debated 
in this body of law (Richards, 2006).  Although it is recognized as a fundamental 
right, the right of privacy "remains a piecemeal, poorly understood, and only 
partially successful body of jurisprudence" (Richards, 2006).   
Solove (2008) provides a succinct overview of the myriad conceptions of 
privacy that have been considered since the idea of privacy was first considered 
in the nineteenth century.  In Solove’s (2008) view, existing theories of privacy 
are either too broad, in that they fail to exclude matters which are not commonly 
deemed private, or too narrow because they fail to include matters commonly 
deemed private.   
The traditional conception of privacy as “the right to be left alone” fails to 
provide enough guidance on what constitutes privacy (Solove, 2008, pp. 15–18).  
Another conception, the view of privacy as “limited access to self,” which 
recognizes an individual’s need to be apart from others, does not discuss the 
degree of intrusion necessary to constitute an invasion of privacy (Solove, 2008, 
pp. 18–21).   
The next conception, secrecy, involves the public disclosure of private 
information and often leads to the finding that once information is disclosed to a 
third party that information can no longer be treated as private, even if a person 
intends to make only a limited disclosure to some but not others (Solove, 2008).  
According to Solove (2008), using secrecy as the common element of privacy is 
too narrow because it fails to account for a person’s desire to regulate the 
amount of disclosure desired; in other words, the difference is in protecting 
confidentiality rather than secrecy.  The theory of control over personal 
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information addresses some of the flaws of the secrecy theory but is too narrow 
in that it concerns informational but not autonomy privacy. It is too vague in that it 
does not delineate the categories of information privacy that a person should 
have control of, and it fails to consider that the individual should not be the only 
party to decide what information should be protected; society should have a say 
as well (Solove, 2008).   
Another theory is that of protecting the personhood of integrity of an 
individual’s personality against invasion by government.  This theory fails 
according to Solove (2008) because it fails to adequately define “personhood” 
and thus improperly leaves the definition up to the government to choose and 
then enforce.  A final theory, protecting intimacy, is based on the assumption that 
privacy is important not only to individuals but to relationships.  Solove (2008) 
believes this theory is at once both too broad, in that “intimacy” is insufficiently 
defined and without limitations of scope, and too narrow, in that it focuses on 
relationships to the exclusion of other realms in which privacy operates. 
The issue with theories of privacy that are too narrow is that privacy issues 
are often overlooked by the law; theories that are too broad tend to have too little 
meaning to lead to constructive answers to problems (Solove, 2008).  Instead, 
seeing privacy as a grouping of related, but distinct, matters means that “if we no 
longer must search for one unifying common trait in all privacy violations, we can 
identify many specific elements of privacy without sacrificing inclusiveness” 
(Solove, 2008, p. 44). 
As Solove (2008) posits, the elusiveness of a single, widely accepted 
definition of privacy can be sidestepped by recognizing that there can be different 
forms of privacy that related in a familial sense, rather than by continuing the 
usual, but unavailing approach which seeks to isolate a characteristic of privacy 
that is common to all usages. The key to this taxonomic framework is that privacy 
is considered in a contextual manner by conceptualizing privacy by means of 
“focusing on the specific types of disruption” that a particular invasion of privacy 
engenders (Solove, 2008, p. 9; also see p. 47).   
 10
2. Federal Privacy Statutes 
Several statutes govern the privacy of personal information that is 
collected and used by the federal government.  The Privacy Act of 1974 places 
limitations on the collection, use, and disclosure of government records (called 
“systems of records”) that include names of individuals or other personal 
identifiers.  The Privacy Act also requires federal agencies to define the purpose 
for which the records are kept and to limit their use of the records to the stated 
purpose unless certain exemptions, such as for a criminal investigation, apply.  
The E-Government Act of 2002 requires federal agencies to analyze the privacy 
impact of the collection, storage, management, and sharing of information that 
they conduct.  Known as Privacy Impact Assessments, this analysis is required 
to be conducted any time an agency is procuring or deploying new information 
technology or commences any new collection of data.  However, other than a 
provision pertaining to the use of social security numbers, the Privacy Act applies 
only to the federal government and not to other participants in the ISE. Similarly, 
the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 addresses the 
protection of personal information through computer network security measures, 
but only applies to federal agencies.   
Although these statutes codify privacy rights to a certain extent, their 
application is limited.  Except for the isolated exception noted above, all three 
statutes apply only to the federal government and not to the other major actors in 
homeland security, namely state, local, and tribal governments.  Furthermore, 
even within their application to the federal government, those statutes do not 
apply in all instances.  In the Privacy Act, for example, the statute applies only to 
systems of records.  If the personal information at issue is not kept in a system of 
records, then the Privacy Act’s protections do not apply.  Moreover, in the case of 
the E-Government Act, agency implementation of the Privacy Impact 
Assessment requirement has been inconsistent (GAO, 2007). In discussing the 
similarly uneven application of another federal privacy law, Schwartz (2008)  
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coined the term “privacy theater” to refer to laws that seek “to heighten a feeling 
of privacy protection without actually accomplishing anything substantive in this 
regard” (p. 310). 
3. Selected General Approaches to Protecting Information 
Privacy Rights 
Commentators have identified several possible methods by which to 
implement information privacy protections.  However, there is no unanimity of 
opinion as to the best method to do so. 
a. Legislation 
Glover and Bhatt (2006) caution that that “overly aggressive” laws 
may limit technological innovation and that the needs of corporations (including, 
presumably, government needs) must be balanced against the needs of 
individuals (p. 203).  Furthermore, they believe the need for special laws—as 
opposed to existing privacy laws—to promote privacy is not clear (Glover & 
Bhatt, 2006, p. 203).  In a 2007 report, the Government Accountability Office 
noted the introduction of proposed legislation, entitled the “Privacy Officer with 
Enhanced Rights Act of 2007,” would provide privacy officers with direct report 
authority to Congress without prior comment by other parts of the Executive 
Branch.  Simitis (1987) sees regulation of personal data processing as the 
“decisive test” for whether a society is willing to pay “the price necessary to 
secure the individual’s ability to communicate and participate” (p. 746).  Some 
believe that legislation provides better protection than relying on the judge-made 
rules (common law) because the former can “act more quickly in the face of 
technological change than courts are able to do and to appreciate existing 
technology and the impact of different legal rules (National Research Council, 
2008, p. 153). 
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b. Government Guidelines   
Koontz (2007) states that consistent implementation of appropriate 
privacy protections require comprehensive guidance to channel the development 
and implementation of new technologies, such as Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID).  Koontz (2007) also notes that the 9/11 Commission recommended 
policy guidelines to closely control the types of information agencies should 
share and the types of protection that information must have. The Markle 
Foundation (2002) recommended the use of administrative rules in conjunction 
with training, technology, and congressional oversight. 
c. Internal Agency Processes 
Bamberger and Mulligan (2008) believe that privacy is often in 
conflict with the primary mandates of government agencies, largely due to a 
disinterested bureaucracy (p. 77).  They believe that strong privacy officers, with 
the ability to report directly to Congress, combined with an effective privacy office 
staff, will help raise the relative importance of privacy protection in agency 
processes (Bamberger & Mulligan, 2008, p. 96)  
d. External Oversight   
Bamberger and Mulligan (2008) point to the relative success of 
institutionalization of Environmental Impact Studies in agency decision making 
(as mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1967 [NEPA]), as a 
model for implementing the Privacy Impact Analysis requirement of the E-
Government Act of 2002 (p. 84).  They credit external oversight by the Council on 
Environmental Quality, which developed stringent implementation guidelines and 
by the active role of the judiciary in broadly construing the applicability of NEPA, 
with sanctions levied for agency compliance failures for success of the program 
(Bamberger& Mulligan, 2008, p. 84). 
In summary, court cases concerning the extent of the right of 
information privacy are limited in scope and consider technology of several 
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decades ago.  In general terms, the law of information privacy is not well-defined 
and its exact nature remains a matter of debate among legal scholars and others.  
Exacerbating the lack of a common definition of privacy is that the right itself is 
now affected by increased information sharing in the homeland security context, 
in particular, in the ISE.   
Statutory attempts to plug the gap are only partially successful; 
their effectiveness is limited by each statute’s jurisdictional boundaries and, 
furthermore, by imperfect implementation attempts by the federal agencies they 
are intended to regulate.  As a result, commentators uniformly recognize the 
need to improve, or at least fine-tune, privacy protections to bolster their 
coverage and use, but they are divided as to the most efficacious means to do 
so.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis employs the policy options analysis methodology to compare 
three different approaches to protect privacy rights in the Information Sharing 
Environment.  In essence, the analysis process as used in this thesis is, first, to 
define the problem and then select various criteria by which to evaluate the 
proposed policy options.  Next, projected outcomes are compared and a 
recommendation is made. 
However, in this field there are no commonly used theories or models to 
apply.  In the absence of a particular theory or model to guide this analysis, the 
requirements of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act and the 
stated goals of the ISE are used as a touchstone. 
The existing ISE privacy protection system is evaluated in terms of the 
extent to which the ISE’s stated goals—fostering collaboration, ensuring the 
sharing of information, and protection of privacy rights—are met.  Thus, the 




information—or at least minimize negative externalities that would act as a 
disincentive to sharing information--among members of the ISE through 
collaborative means.   
However, as is discussed in a later section of this thesis, the three 
identified goals of the ISE relevant to the issue of privacy protection—enhancing 
information sharing, encouraging collaborative efforts by ISE participants and 
protecting privacy rights—are not the only measures by which ISE privacy 
protection is considered.  Other criteria—constitutionality, enforceability, 
consistency of application, and political acceptability—are also relevant and 
critical to this policy choice and, accordingly, are used in the evaluation.   
In applying the selected criteria, the PM-ISE’s current system of privacy 
protection through the use of voluntary guidelines is compared to two alternative 
policy approaches to addressing privacy rights. In other words, this thesis 
explores whether alternatives to status quo might provide better privacy 
protection while at the same time providing at least an equivalent amount of 
information sharing using the PM-ISE’s current privacy protection regime as a 
baseline.    
The first alternative policy choice involves voluntarily adopted uniform 
privacy standards as part of a European system for privacy protection of 
information sharing. As it shares a common legal heritage with the United States, 
the European experience with privacy protection is particularly relevant to the 
ISE.  Specifically, this policy choice involves an examination of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, selected decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe Convention on Data 
Protection, the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and associated Additional 
Protocol, and the Europol Convention. 
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The second alternative policy choice to the current ISE system, federally 
mandated privacy standards, is addressed by considering the use of such 
mandates in the realms of the protection of health information, motor vehicle 
records, and criminal intelligence systems.  The federal mandates examined 
include the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, and U.S. Department of Justice regulations 
entitled “Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies.” 
F. SCOPE 
This thesis necessarily covers only a small slice of the overall issue of 
privacy, as a full discussion of this topic would take a multi-volume book to 
adequately cover.  As such, it would be helpful to consider Daniel Solove’s 
(2008) taxonomic approach to privacy that focuses on particular activities that are 
impacted by privacy problems rather than the more common approach, 
historically at least, of attempting to define privacy by a single characteristic.  
Solove (2008) has created a taxonomy that divides the concept of privacy into 
four primary activity types: information collection (including surveillance and 
interrogation), information processing (aggregation and identification), 
information dissemination (disclosure and accessibility), and invasion (intrusion 
and decisional interference) (Solove, 2008).  
For the purposes of this thesis, in order for the theoretical information to 
be shared, this researcher assumes that the necessary information collection and 
processing has been done in full accordance with all applicable laws, and that 
the resulting information is properly in the possession of an ISE participant.  Also, 
the researcher assumes for purposes of this thesis that the issue at hand does 
not comprise a problem implicating what Solove (2008) deems and information 
“invasion.”  Hence, this thesis concentrates on the “information dissemination” 
activity.  In other words, once information is legally within the control of a single 
ISE participant, what controls are in place—or should be in place—to ensure that 
privacy is adequately protected when that information is shared within the ISE? 
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Next, as is discussed later, the most pronounced gap in privacy protection 
in the ISE concerns state, local and tribal governments, and private sector 
participants.  The various privacy guidelines issued by the ISE Program Manager 
have been made binding on federal agencies; and although individual agencies 
are permitted to promulgate their own standards, they are strictly voluntary for 
non-federal participants.  Accordingly, much, though not all, of the analysis 
focuses on the issue of standards as it applies to state, local and tribal 
governments and, to a lesser extent, the private sector. 
Finally, this thesis explores the need for uniform standards and the issue 
of possible governance and oversight mechanisms.  However, the nuts-and-bolts 
of the actual standards themselves are beyond the scope of this research and, 
as is explained later, are probably best left to the ISE participants to determine. 
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II. THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT 
As is discussed above, the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was 
mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA) and was intended to build on existing information sharing systems and 
promote increased information sharing through creation of a collaborative culture 
among a diverse group federal and non-federal participants.  In the words of the 
ISE Program Manager:  
[T]he Information Sharing Environment (ISE) supports five 
communities—Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Defense, Homeland 
Security, & Foreign Affairs—by leveraging existing capabilities and 
aligning policies, standards and systems to ensure those 
responsible for combating terrorism have access to timely and 
accurate information. An improved Information Sharing 
Environment is being constructed on a foundation of trusted 
partnerships among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, 
the private sector, and our foreign allies—partnerships based on a 
shared commitment to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and 
mitigate the effects of terrorism against the United States. (PM-ISE, 
n.d.) 
The Government Accountability Office describes the ISE as follows: 
The ISE is not bounded by a single federal agency or component.  
While the Program Manager has been placed within the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, from an operational 
perspective, the ISE is to reach across all levels of government as 
well as the private sector and foreign partners.  As such, the 
program is a broad-based coordination and collaboration effort 
among various stakeholders.  In essence, the ISE can be viewed 
as a set of cross-cutting communications links—encompassing 
policies, processes, technologies—among and between the various 
entities that gather, analyze, and share terrorism-related 
information. (GAO, 2008, p. 10) 
The following documents, discussed below, concern the historical context 
of the ISE, its statutory basis, its policy-based underpinnings, and the scope of 
duties of the ISE Program Manager. 
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A. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 
Created by Public Law 107-236 (November 27, 2002) as a bipartisan 
group in the wake of the devastating and shocking attacks of September 11, 
2001, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(more commonly known as the 9/11 Commission) was charged with determining 
why the United States was seemingly unprepared for the attacks of that day, and 
how such attacks could be avoided in the future. The group’s findings, contained 
in the 9/11 Commission Report, were eagerly anticipated. 
The lack of information sharing played a big part in the failing of the United 
States to anticipate and respond to the 9/11 attacks. Consequently, one of the 
central recommendations of the commission was to unify “the many participants 
in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based 
information-based system that transcends traditional government boundaries” 
(9/11 Commission, 2003, p. 400).  Although it focused on the foreign-domestic 
divide of intelligence information sharing, the Commission’s recommendation that 
the intelligence community’s work be held to a common standard for collection, 
processing, reporting, sharing, and analysis (9/11 Commission, 2003, p. 409) 
would seem to be equally applicable to the ISE as a whole as well. 
In making its information sharing and other recommendations, the 9/11 
Commission recognized that the protection of privacy rights was a key 
consideration, stating that a “shift of power and authority to the government calls 
for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties 
that are vital to our way of life” (9/11 Commission, 2003, p. 394).  The 
commission recommended that along with a change in how information is shared 
that adequate oversight and guidelines to protect civil liberties, in particular it 
recommended that an executive branch board be established to oversee 
compliance with those guidelines (9/11 Commission, 2003, p. 395). 
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B. INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 
2004 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA, 
codified at 6 U.S.C. 485) required the establishment of “an information sharing 
environment for the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with 
national security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil 
liberties” (section 1016(b)(1)(A)).  The “information sharing environment” is 
defined by the act as, in part as “an approach that facilitates the sharing of 
terrorism information” (IRPTA, 2004, section 1016(a)(2)). “Terrorism information,” 
in turn, is defined as information regarding foreign or international terrorist 
groups, or domestic persons or groups with connections to transnational 
terrorism (though not to purely domestic terrorists) (IRPTA, 2004, Section 
1016(a)(4)). Significantly, though, IRTPA does not define which privacy-related 
legal standards apply to the sharing of terrorism information, nor is privacy, itself, 
defined in the act.  
The ISE is intended to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information among 
federal, state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector through the 
“use of policy guidelines and technologies” (IRTPA, 2004, section 1016(b)(2)).  
The incorporation of privacy protections is provided for in section 1016 (b) (2)(H) 
(IRPTA, 2004).  IRPTA (2004) mandated that the President issue guidelines, in 
consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,1 to “protect 
privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the ISE” (section 
1016(d)(2)). 
The designation of Program Manager for the ISE is provided for in section 
1016(f) of IRPTA (2004). The Program Manager, in consultation with the 
Information Sharing Council, is responsible, in part, for assisting in the 
development of “policies, procedures, guidelines, rules and standards” (section 
1016(f)(2)(A)(ii)) that “ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties” (section 
                                            
1 Established by section 1061 of IRPTA. 
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1016(f)(2)(B)(viii)).  In turn, the Information Sharing Council is required to 
consider input from non-federal agencies and persons in providing advice to the 
Program Manager in the development of “policies, procedures, guidelines, roles, 
and standards” for the ISE (sections 1016(g)(2) and 1016(g)(3)). 
C. IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
ACT OF 2007  
Section 504 of the “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007” (9/11 Commission Act) amended section 1016 of 
IRPTA. Among other things, the 9/11 Commission Act (2007) expanded the 
definition of “terrorism information” (section 504(1)(D)). The 9/11 Commission Act 
(2007) also authorized the Program Manager to identify and resolve information 
sharing disputes but only among federal agencies (section 504(6)). 
D. EXECUTIVE ORDER 133882 
Executive Order (E.O.) 13388, entitled “Further Strengthening the Sharing 
of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans,” was signed by President Bush on 
October 25, 2005.  E.O. 13888 stipulated the President’s policy for the design 
and use of information systems, including protection of the “freedom, information 
privacy, and other legal rights of Americans in the conduct of [information sharing 
activities]” (2005, section 1.(b)).  Section 5 of the Executive Order established the 
Information Sharing Council, composed of representatives from various federal 
agencies with the mission to “provide advice and information” concerning 
establishment of the ISE and to carry out the relevant duties mandated by IRPTA 
(E.O. 13388, 2005).  Under the section entitled “general provisions,” E.O. 13388 
(2005) stipulated that it be implemented consistent with “applicable law, including 
Federal law protecting the information privacy and other legal rights of 
Americans” (section 7). 
                                            
2 Other, earlier, Executive Orders concerning intelligence and information sharing include 
E.O. 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, E.O. 13353, Establishing the President’s Board 
on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties, E.O. 13356, Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism 
Information to Protect Americans, and E.O. 13311, Homeland Security Information Sharing. 
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Again, as was the case with IRTPA’s reference to “applicable legal 
standards relating to privacy and civil liberties,” E.O. 13388 is silent as to exactly 
what information privacy law is applicable.  Furthermore, as for all Executive 
Orders, E.O. 13388 has mandatory effect only on entities within the President’s 
direct control, i.e., federal executive branch agencies. 
E. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING 
The National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS), published in 
October 2007, put forth the Bush Administration’s plan for envisioning and 
achieving improvements to information sharing.  The NSIS expressly recognizes 
the importance of “trusted partnerships among all levels of government, the 
private sector, and our foreign allies” to improving the ISE (NSIS, 2007, p. 1).  
The NSIS promotes the incorporation of state and major urban fusion centers in 
the national ISE, which in the strategy’s view, would require those fusion centers 
to achieve both “a baseline level of capability to gather, process, share, and 
utilize information and operate in a manner that respects individuals’ privacy 
rights and other legal rights protected by U.S. laws” (NSIS, 2007, p. 3).   
Similarly, the NSIS speaks of the need to improve information sharing with 
the private sector and recognizes the need to “[e]stablish mechanisms and 
processes to ensure compliance with all relevant U.S. laws, including applicable 
information privacy laws” (NSIS, 2007, p. 22).  The NSIS (2007) also discusses 
the need to develop information privacy standards and practices in conjunction 
with information sharing agreements with foreign nations (p. 26). 
Significantly, the ISIS recognizes that with “proper planning we can have 
both enhanced privacy protections and increased information sharing—and in 
fact, we must achieve this balance at all levels of government, in order to 
maintain the trust of the American people” (NSIS, 2007, p. 27).  Referring to the 
ISE Privacy Guidelines as a set of “core principles that federal departments and 
agencies must follow,” the NSIS calls on federal agencies to disclose protected 
information to non-federal entities only when those entities provide privacy 
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protection that is comparable to that of the federal government (NSIS, 2007, p. 
28).  Although the ISE Privacy Guidelines are currently binding only on federal 
agencies, the NSIS contemplates making receipt of federal grants by state and 
urban area fusion centers conditional upon meeting certain unspecified, but 
presumably including privacy requirements and baseline operational standards 
(NSIS, 2007, p. A1-5 [Appendix 1]). 
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III. POLICY EVALUATION CRITERIA 
For purposes of this thesis, the protection of privacy rights are evaluated 
using several criteria derived from the stated purposes of the ISE:  fostering 
collaboration, ensuring information sharing and protecting privacy rights.  The 
privacy rights criterion consists of three sub-criteria: constitutionality, 
enforceability, and consistency of application.  In addition, political acceptability is 
relevant and critical to consider in any policy choice and, accordingly, is included 
as a criterion in the analysis process.   
A. FOSTERING COLLABORATION 
Does the policy encourage collaboration by ISE participants?  The ISE’s 
goals include promotion of increased information sharing through creation of a 
collaborative culture among a diverse group of participants.  Similarly, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act requires that the Information 
Sharing Council consider input from non-federal agencies and persons in 
providing advice to the ISE Program Manager in the development of “policies, 
procedures, guidelines, roles, and standards” for the ISE” (sections 1016(g)(2) 
and 1016(g)(3)).  Policy options are evaluated on their expected impact on 
increased collaboration in the ISE.  A related consideration is the effect of the 
policy choice on stakeholder participation in the ISE. 
In its publications, the PM-ISE tends to address collaboration primarily in 
terms of technical tools to enable ISE participants to share information and data 
(see ISE Implementation Plan, p. 51, ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework, pp. 
67, 73–74 and the ISE Common Terrorism Information Sharing Standards 
(CTISS) Program Manual, Version 1.0, passim).  A succinct definition of 
collaboration in a broader, non-technical sense is nowhere to be found in ISE 
publications though. Such an omission is not surprising, for in a 2006 report on 
results-oriented government, the Government Accountability Office found that 
there was no widely accepted definition for collaboration.  However, for the 
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purpose of the report, the GAO defined collaboration as “any joint activity by two 
or more organizations that is intended to produce more public value than could 
be produced when the agency acts alone” (GAO-06-15, 2006, p. 6).  The GAO’s 
definition of collaboration is appropriate for the goals of the ISE and is used in 
this thesis. 
In its report, the GAO (2006) identified “key practices that can help 
enhance and sustain collaboration” (p. 32).  Although these practices, and the 
report itself, were focused on collaboration by federal agencies, there is no 
reason these practices could not, and should not, be applied to the ISE.  The 
identified key collaboration practices are: 
 Define and articulate a common outcome.  
 Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies designed to help 
align activities, core processes and resources to achieve a common 
outcome.  
 Identify and address needs by leveraging resources to support the 
common outcome and, where necessary, opportunities to leverage 
resources.  
 Agree on roles and responsibilities, including leadership.  
 Establish compatible policies, procedures and other means to 
operate across agency boundaries, including compatible standards 
and data systems, and communicate frequently to address such 
matters as cultural differences.  
 Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate and report on the results 
of the collaborative effort.  
 Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts by using 
strategic and annual performance plans to establish 
complementary goals and strategies and by using performance 
reports to account for results. 
 Reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through 
performance management systems by identifying competencies 
related to collaboration and setting performance expectations for 
collaboration. (GAO, 2006, pp. 4-5 [best practice examples 
omitted]) 
This thesis also uses these factors to evaluate the collaborative impact of 
the selected policies. 
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B. ENSURING INFORMATION SHARING 
Improved information sharing has been a consistent and important goal of 
the U.S. counterterrorism effort ever since the 9/11 Commission identified 
intelligence gaps as one of the reasons the United States failed to adequately 
anticipate and respond to the attacks of September 11, 2001.  As is the case 
when looking for a definition of collaboration, the PM-ISE’s various documents do 
not have a succinct definition of information sharing.  However, the ISE 
Implementation Plan, in a discussion comparing the current and expected future 
states of the ISE, contains a useful summary of the ISE’s information sharing 
goal: 
The challenge remains to improve coordination of sharing within 
and across the five Federal communities with counterterrorism 
responsibilities—intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland 
security, and foreign affairs—and with [state, local, and tribal] 
governments, the private sector, and foreign partners to achieve 
the coordinated multi-agency perspective necessary for 
comprehensive analysis as well as to ensure dissemination of 
the right information to the right people at the right time 
[emphasis added]. (ISE Implementation Guide, 2006, p. 26) 
Accordingly, policy alternatives are evaluated as to the extent they 
promote improved information sharing (as defined above) from the viewpoint of 
privacy protection.  In other words, does the policy option being analyzed permit 
the improvement, or at least a status quo level, of information sharing?  Will the 
selected information privacy protection system be seen as a “drag” or as a 
disincentive to information sharing? 
C. PROTECTION OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 
As discussed above, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze various 
options for implementation of privacy standards in the ISE, rather the specific 
makeup of the privacy standards themselves.  Therefore, the emphasis of this 




Is the policy constitutionally defensible? This thesis proceeds under the 
assumption that considerable latitude exists to amend existing statutes or to craft 
new statutes to implement virtually any system of privacy protection that could 
eventually be chosen to apply to the ISE as long as the selected method would 
withstand constitutional challenge.  Thus, no matter which policy option of the 
three discussed here, or another, completely different option, the constitutionality 
of any such privacy protection system is a threshold issue that must be 
addressed first.  Any privacy protection system that does not pass constitutional 
muster simply—absent a constitutional amendment—cannot be implemented, no 
matter how well it otherwise performs in meeting the remaining criteria. 
Fortunately, for advocates of minimal interference with the free flow of 
information, current Supreme Court jurisprudence, as has been discussed, poses 
little restriction.  As previously discussed, Supreme Court precedents, in effect, 
treat information as either entirely private or entirely public, with either relatively 
complete protection or virtually no protection, respectively. With limited 
exceptions for privileged communications, such as the attorney-client privilege, 
once information is communicated to a third party there ceases to be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and, thus, no constitutional privacy protection.   
Furthermore, to the extent that the court’s dicta in Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589 (1977), (discussed supra) can be seen as a guide to future rulings, the 
court appears to be sympathetic to the necessity for law enforcement and other 
government functions to acquire and use vast quantities of often personal 
information, if accompanied by protection to avoid unwarranted disclosures.   
However, to the extent that the chosen policy option operates to preempt 
state privacy law, the constitutionality of the privacy option must also be 
evaluated in terms of the constitutional concept of federalism, which essentially 
concerns the allocation of power between the federal and state governments.  As 
is discussed infra, the Supreme Court has two parallel lines of cases pertaining 
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to this issue. In a case from the first line, the court has found unconstitutional a 
federal statute that mandated that a state enact a particular kind of law, thereby 
improperly overriding that state’s legislative authority.  In a second line of cases, 
however, the court in one case upheld a federal statute where the statute’s effect 
was to regulate state activities rather than the means by which the state 
regulated private parties. 
2. Consistency of Application 
In a 2005 Presidential Memorandum entitled “Guidelines and 
Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment,” President 
Bush stated that “ISE must, to the extent possible be supported by common 
standards that maximize the acquisition, access, retention, production, use, 
management, and sharing of terrorism information within the ISE” (Bush, 2005, 
2.a.).  
This recognition mirrored the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission 
that the intelligence community’s work be held to a common standard for 
collection, processing, reporting, sharing and analysis; a recommendation that is 
equally applicable to the ISE.  Moreover, the ISE Implementation Plan (2006) 
recognizes that “laws, policies, and rules [used by the various ISE participants] 
differ and create both real and perceived impediments to information sharing” (p. 
16).   
In this regard, the evaluation of this criterion proceeds on the belief that 
privacy protections should not vary on the basis of geographical location or the 
type of agency that disseminates information.  Privacy protection should be the 
same whether a given piece of data resides on a server in New York, a computer 
in Arizona or is disseminated from a federal agency to a state or from a state to a 
local government.    
To what extent do privacy protections vary from ISE participant to 
participant?  The policy options are evaluated as to the extent to which they 
encourage or require uniform standards for all ISE participants. 
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3. Enforceability 
What procedures are in place to ensure that the adopted privacy 
standards are actually and properly implemented?  In a 2005 Presidential 
Memorandum, the Secretary of Homeland Security and Attorney General were 
directed to jointly issue standards for use by state, local, and tribal governments, 
law enforcement agencies and the private sector “on a mandatory basis where 
possible and a voluntary basis where not (Bush, 2005, 2.a.).   
In the ISE Implementation Plan (2006), the need for “[d]eveloping policies 
and procedures for reporting, investigating, and responding to violations of 
policies and procedures regarding the handling of protected information” is 
recognized as an objective of the ISE (pp. 21-22).  Another ISE objective is the 
implementation of mechanisms to ensure that protected information handling 
complies with applicable legal requirements (ISE Implementation Plan, 2006). 
Even the best privacy standards possible are without effect if they are 
disregarded without penalty.  Thus, the enforceability of each policy option is an 
evaluative criterion. 
D. POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY 
What is the expected political opposition to the policy?  According to 
Bardach (2005), “a feasible policy must be politically acceptable, or at least not 
too unacceptable” (p. 32).  Political unacceptability is comprised of either too 
much opposition or too little support (Bardach, 2005).  When a proposal is 
considered in a legislative setting, Jansson (2000) divides political acceptability 
into three practical emphases: political considerations (opposition 
notwithstanding a proposal’s merits), rational considerations (a cost/benefit 
calculation, for example) and values (such as religious beliefs) that may trump 
the other emphases in certain situations. 
This criterion, in essence, goes to the feasibility of the policy option under 
consideration.  Even if a certain policy option has the support of working-level 
ISE participants, can that support be translated into adoption of the measure?  
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Will the selected policy option require legislative action at only the federal level to 
implement, or will legislation have to be passed by every state?  Consideration of 
this criterion has implications for the overall success or failure of the policy 
options under consideration. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE POLICY APPROACHES FOR THE ISE 
PRIVACY PROTECTION 
This chapter examines three different approaches to privacy protection 
that are currently being used in the public policy sphere: voluntary guidelines, 
voluntarily adopted mandatory standards and federally imposed mandatory 
standards.  First, the PM-ISE’s current system of privacy protection through the 
use of voluntary guidelines is examined. Next, the European system of voluntarily 
adopted mandatory standards is analyzed.  Finally, several examples of federally 
imposed standards, by means of either statute or regulation, are discussed. A 
summary of each policy option is followed by an analysis of how that option 
meets the criteria of fostering collaboration, ensuring information sharing, 
protection of privacy rights and political acceptability. 
A. STATUS QUO: VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES  
This discussion concerns the various documents that comprise the PM-
ISE’s privacy protection guidelines.  Federal agencies are nominally subject to 
these guidelines.  However, as discussed below, the guidelines are very general 
in nature and the actual privacy standards to be used by federal agencies are left 
up to each agency to develop on its own.  Furthermore, although the PM-ISE is 
directed to “ensure” that non-federal ISE participants have privacy protections 
that are at least equivalent to the guidelines applicable to federal participants, 
there are, again, only very general guidelines to follow.  In addition, there no 
authorities or procedures by which the PM-ISE can ensure a certain level of 
privacy protection actually exists. 
1. Presidential Memorandum: “Guidelines and Requirements in 
Support of the Information Sharing Environment”  
Building on initial steps to implement the ISE-related provision of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, on December 16, 
2005, President Bush directed the heads of federal executive departments and 
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agencies to implement various additional actions to implement the Information 
Sharing Environment (Bush, 2005). Although, as is discussed below, the 
memorandum made prominent mention of state, local, and tribal governments, 
law enforcement agencies, and the private sector, the memorandum was 
directed to and binding only on federal departments and agencies.  
Among other requirements, the President directed that the “ISE must, to 
the extent possible be supported by common standards that maximize the 
acquisition, access, retention, production, use, management, and sharing of 
terrorism information within the ISE” (Bush, 2005, 2.a.).  In that regard, the 
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with various listed agency heads, 
was directed to issue:  
Common standards (i) for preparing terrorism information for 
maximum distribution and access, (ii) to enable the acquisition, 
access, retention, production, use, management, and sharing of 
terrorism information within the ISE while safeguarding such 
information and protecting sources and methods from unauthorized 
use or disclosure, (iii) for implementing legal requirements relating 
to the handling of specific types of information, and (iv) that include 
the appropriate method for the Government-wide adoption and 
implementation of such standards.  Such standards shall 
accommodate and reflect the sharing of terrorism information, as 
appropriate, with State, local, and tribal governments, law 
enforcement agencies, and the private sector. (Bush, 2005, 2.a.) 
Furthermore, the Secretary of Homeland Security and Attorney General 
were directed to jointly issue standards for use by state, local, and tribal 
governments, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector “on a mandatory 
basis where possible and a voluntary basis where not (Bush, 2005, 2.a.).  In 
addition, in directing the development of a common framework for information 
sharing, the memorandum recognized that state, local, and tribal governments, 
law enforcement agencies, and the private sector “must have the opportunity to 
participate as full partners in the ISE, to the extent consistent with applicable 
laws … and the protection of the information privacy rights and other legal rights 
of Americans” (Bush, 2005, 2.b.).  The memorandum was criticized for 
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“undermining both statutory and Constitutional protections for privacy” and for not 
protecting the privacy of non-Americans at all (Rotenberg, 2007). 
2. PM-ISE “Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy and 
Other Legal Rights of Americans are Protected in the 
Development and Use of the Information Sharing 
Environment” 
In a December 4, 2006 memorandum, PM-ISE Thomas McNamara issued 
the Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy and Other Legal Rights of 
Americans are Protected in the Development and Use of the Information Sharing 
Environment (McNamara, 2006).  The Guidelines (2006) apply to “agencies,” 
meaning federal executive agencies, as defined (section 13 and passim).  The 
only reference to state, local, and tribal governments, law enforcement agencies, 
and the private sector is a direction to the PM-ISE to “work with non-federal 
agencies entities seeking to access protected information through the ISE to 
ensure that such non-Federal entities develop and implement appropriate 
policies and procedures that provide protections that are at least as 
comprehensive as those contained in these Guidelines” (Guidelines, 2006, 
section 11). 
Federal agencies are required to adopt their own policies and procedures 
to ensure compliance with laws pertaining to the receipt, retention, and sharing of 
information and to change rules that “pose a risk to information privacy,” 
“significantly impede” information sharing under an internal agency policy, or any 
other non-agency restriction that significantly impedes information sharing but 
does not appear to be necessary to protect information privacy rights 
(Guidelines, 2006, section 2).  Protected information, as defined by the 
Guidelines (2006), can be shared in the ISE only if that information is terrorism 
information, homeland security information, or law enforcement information, as 
those terms are also defined in the Guidelines.   
Agencies, in addition to have physical data security, are required to “have 
and enforce policies for reporting, investigating, and responding to violations of 
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agency policy relating to protected information” and implement audit and review 
mechanisms to verify compliance with the Guidelines (2006, section 7).  
Agencies are also directed to implement internal complaint redress procedures 
(Guidelines, 2006).   
Several methods of governance are discussed in section 12 of the 
Guidelines (2006).  First, each agency’s senior privacy official is tasked with 
directly overseeing the agency’s implementation of and compliance with the 
Guidelines (Guidelines, 2006, section 12.a.).  Second, an “ISE Privacy 
Guidelines Committee” is to be established by the PM-ISE to provide 
implementation guidance, encourage consistent legal interpretations and serve 
as a forum for inter-agency issue resolution (Guidelines, 2006, section 12.b.).  
Next, the ISE Privacy Guidelines Committee is directed to consult with the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board concerning the protection of privacy 
and civil liberties in the ISE (Guidelines, 2006, section 12.c.).  Finally, each 
agency, in consultation with the ISE Privacy Guidelines Committee, is required to 
implement its own written ISE privacy policy (Guidelines, 2006, section 12.d.). 
3. PM-ISE “Privacy and Civil Liberties Implementation Guide” 
About nine months after the Guidelines were issued, the PM-ISE released 
the “Privacy and Civil Liberties Implementation Guide” (Implementation Guide, 
2007).  The Implementation Guide was intended to help federal agencies 
implement the Guidelines, as a framework focusing on federal agency issues.  
The Implementation Guide, however, was “not specifically applied for use by 
nonfederal entities, notably state, local, and tribal entities” (2007, Overview at p. 
1).  Instead, non-federal entities were directed to refer to privacy guidance in 
Guideline 8 of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Fusion Center Guidelines 
(Implementation Guide, 2007, Overview). The two-page Guideline 8 suggests 
that fusion centers develop, publish and follow a privacy and civil liberties policy 
that complies with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and other 
sources of privacy protection practices (Fusion Center Guidelines, n.d.).   
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The Implementation Guide “describes best practices and a methodology 
to ensure implementation of the protections and safeguards required by the ISE 
Privacy Guidelines” (2007, Overview at p. 2).  The Implementation Guide is not 
prescriptive but is to be used by each agency to develop its own privacy policy 
that reflects its “unique environment” (2007, Overview at pp. 2-3).  The 
implementation process is described as “iterative” in recognizing that 
reevaluation may be needed if new requirements or sharing arrangements are 
implemented (Implementation Guide, 2007, Overview at pp. 3-4).  After a brief 
review of the authorities forming the basis for the ISE, the Implementation Guide 
(2007) discusses a two-stage implementation process.  The first stage concerns 
the identification and assessment of applicable policies and law and assuring that 
there are no gaps in the coverage of privacy policy protections (Implementation 
Guide, 2007, p. 7).  The second stage uses the same “identify, assess, protect” 
process for agencies to demonstrate their compliance with the ISE Privacy 
Guidelines (Implementation Guide, 2007, pp. 7-8).  A graphic showing the 















Figure 1.   Implementation Guide (From Implementation Guide 2007, p.10) 
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The remainder of the Implementation Guide (2007) contains detailed, 
step-by-step instructions for using the two-step implementation process. 
4. PM-ISE “Privacy and Civil Liberties Implementation Manual”  
In 2008, the PM-ISE released the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Implementation Manual, an online compendium of tools and resources to assist 
efforts to implement the Privacy Guidelines.  The Implementation Manual (2008) 
consists of six Web-based sections, entitled, “Overview,” “Senior Leadership,” 
“Agency Privacy Officials,” “Federal Employees,” “Non-Federal Entities,” and, 
finally, “Resources.” 
a. Overview 
In addition to an issuance memorandum from the PM-ISE to federal 
department and agency heads, this section includes an Executive Summary, 
which covers the creation and function of the ISE, the role of the PM-ISE and ISE 
privacy guidelines (Implementation Manual, 2008).  Also included is an online 
document entitled “Background on Protecting Information Privacy and Other 
Legal Rights in the context of the ISE,” which includes, as the document’s title 
implies, a discussion of the meaning of information privacy and civil rights and 
liberties, followed by a summary of the ISE Privacy Guidelines. 
b. Senior Leadership 
This section discusses the key role senior leadership plays in 
implementing the ISE and its attendant Privacy Guidelines and reiterates the 
privacy protection policies that each agency must implement and follow 
(Implementation Manual, 2008).   
c. Agency Privacy Officials 
Directed to the agencies’ senior officials with “overall responsibility 
for information privacy issues,” this section includes various documents relating 
to the role and composition of the Privacy Guidelines Committee, in addition to 
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providing a direct link to the Implementation Guide (Implementation Manual, 
2008).  This section also includes an online document entitled, “Key Issue 
Guidance: (Implementation Manual, 2008).  The Key Issues Guidance provides 
additional, in-depth guidance and optional “exemplary” privacy protection 
elements concerning several privacy protection issues, including redress, notice 
mechanisms, data quality, data security, accountability, enforcement and auditing 
(Implementation Manual, 2008).    
d. Federal Employees 
This section highlights the essential “front line” role of federal 
employees in implementing the Privacy Guidelines (Implementation Manual, 
2008).   
e. Non-Federal Entities 
A statement is made in this section that the “materials on this Web 
page currently focus on …sharing between federal agencies and do not 
specifically apply to non-federal entities, such as State, local, and tribal entities or 
the private sector” (Implementation Manual, 2008).  However, a linked page 
entitled “Working with State, Local, and Tribal Governments” 
(http://www.ise.gov/pages/privacy-slt.html) notes that the ISE Privacy Guidelines 
Committee has set up a State, Local, and Tribal Working Group to develop 
privacy protections for information sharing with the federal government 
(Implementation Manual, 2008). The state, local and tribal government page also 
includes links to the aforementioned Fusion Center Guidelines, Department of 
Justice privacy policy development guide, National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan, 28 CFR Part 23 (privacy standards for fusion centers that receive certain 
types of federal funding; discussed infra) and guides for state, local and tribal law 
enforcement on civil rights, law enforcement intelligence and the intelligence 
fusion process (Implementation Manual, 2008).   
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f. Resources 
This section includes links to various ISE background information, 
including Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, Executive Order 13388, the ISE-PM Privacy Guidelines Memorandum, 
Section 504 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
of 2007, and the National Strategy for Information Sharing—all of which are 
discussed supra.  The section also includes links to various privacy protection 
implementation tools. 
5. State Privacy Laws 
A full survey of the myriad of state privacy laws is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  Suffice it to say for  purposes of this thesis that state privacy law is a 
balkanized conglomeration of hundreds of laws and regulations found in 
countless nooks and crannies of various volumes of state statute books—called 
a “bewildering assortment” of protections (Solove,2002, p 1172) and referred to 
as “uncharted territory” (Schwartz, 1995, p. 604).  According to Schwartz (1995), 
although some data protection is on the books everywhere, “no two states have 
adopted exactly the same system of regulation” (p. 604) and, furthermore, this 
lack of comprehensive laws at the state level “creates gaping weaknesses” in 
data protection (p. 605).  Finally, most states lack a statute equivalent to the 
Privacy Act (Solove, Rotenberg, 2003). 
This uneasy combination of state and federal laws leads to “a rather 
haphazard and unsatisfactory response to each of the privacy concerns” 
(Reidenberg, 1992, p. 208).  Reidenberg (1992) goes on to say that “[d]ifferences 
in privacy protection among the states could readily have adverse or distorting 
effects on interstate commerce and international data flows” leading to his 
recommendation that “it may be most appropriate to adopt any new rights at the 
federal level” (p. 238). 
Solove (2002), recognizing that information no longer remains localized, 
concurs, believing that the most efficient and effective method to regulate data 
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flows is through “a strong national information policy rather than widely diverging 
state public record regimes” (p. 1200).  He believes that this “federal baseline” 
would provide a minimum level of uniform protection to public records but should 
permit states to enact stricter requirements (Solove, 2002, p. 1200).  Solove 
(2002) suggests that this uniform, nationwide privacy protection could be done 
either by extending the federal Privacy Act to the states or by requiring each 
state to enact its own law equivalent to the Privacy Act.  Although Schwartz 
(1995) agrees that federal mandates can be beneficial where national uniformity 
is needed or state laws are deficient, he asserts that omnibus state laws are also 
needed to ensure full protection. 
6. Analysis 
a. Fostering Collaboration  
The current PM-ISE privacy program clearly makes privacy 
protection a central and common goal of entire ISE community.  Privacy 
protection is a recurring theme in PM-ISE documents, including the 
Implementation Plan.  The plan for achieving privacy protection is essentially 
reliant on the voluntary efforts of the ISE members to bring their own protection 
programs into alignment.  There is no plan for leveraging ISE member privacy 
programs to produce an outcome greater in value than any single privacy 
program in isolation.   
Furthermore, although several ISE documents refer to the need to 
ensure by all ISE participants with applicable information privacy laws the current 
system is mandatory only for federal agencies. Although the NSIS calls on the 
federal government to share information with non-federal parties only when those 
parties have privacy protection comparable to the federal protections, that 
document is aspirational rather than binding for any ISE participant.   
There exists, at present, no established cross-boundary agency 
standards for privacy protection.  In addition, there is currently no ISE-wide plan 
to ensure organizational or individual accountability for collaborative privacy 
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protection.  Despite the recognition on the part of the federal government of the 
need to ensure privacy protection at a certain base level, the current PM-ISE 
system for privacy protection is, in essence, a completely voluntary system with 
little control.  Collaboration is not fostered by the current voluntary privacy 
guidelines. 
b. Ensuring Information Sharing 
The potential impact of voluntary privacy protection standards could 
arguably been seen to have either positive or negative effects on information 
sharing itself—getting the right information to the right people at the right time.  
Where ISE participants are not actually required to ensure that the recipient of 
the information shared has compliant privacy standards, the resultant time 
savings from skipping this step would help speed the exchange of information.    
However, having each participant operate under its own set of 
privacy rules would run counter to, or at least not improve, coordinated multi-
agency information sharing.  Furthermore, as discussed above, some ISE 
participants may be more reluctant to share information if they believe 
information recipients have inadequate protections in place or are unsure if 
protections are adequate.  Also, public support for information sharing may suffer 
if privacy concerns exist, and as public support often correlates with political 
support, overall support for information sharing may decrease. 
On balance, the lack of uniform privacy protection standards would 
seem to have a negative effect on information sharing.   
c. Protection of Privacy Rights 
1)  Constitutionality.  As discussed above, the Supreme 
Court, on the whole, seems to be well disposed to the use of personal 
information for certain government functions—presumably including 
counterterrorism purposes.  However, support for that use is predicated upon the 
existence of adequate statutory or regulatory protections.  The current system of 
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voluntary guidelines results in privacy protection that could conceivably range 
from very extensive to less than optimal.  The variability of this voluntary system 
may lead to a court’s finding that the wide disparity in privacy protection among 
the various ISE participants provides insufficient privacy safeguards.   
The Supreme Court has treated federal efforts to impose 
requirements on states in one of two ways—either as an impermissible 
usurpation of state legislative authority or a permissible exercise of power to 
regulate state activities.  Neither line of reasoning would come into play in the 
current ISE system of voluntary guidelines, however, as there are effectively no 
federal requirements at play. 
2).  Consistency of Application.  Although ISE participants 
are encouraged to adopt the PM-ISE’s privacy guidelines, there is no 
requirement to do so.  As demonstrated in this thesis, the extent of privacy 
protection provided by state law is highly variable.  In addition, no state has a 
comprehensive statute equivalent to the Privacy Act of 1974, which is applicable 
only to federal agencies. Thus, the consistency of application must be considered 
very low.   
3).  Enforceability.  Again, although many NSIS and other 
documents speak of ensuring adequate privacy protection by all ISE participants, 
including by withholding information to participants with insufficient protections, 
there is no practical means by which to enforce the PM-ISE privacy guidelines.  
There is currently no system to enforce privacy protections by means of 
withholding information and no procedures for reporting, investigating or 
responding to failures, or apparent failures, to follow the privacy guidelines.  
In sum, the current system of voluntary privacy standards 
appears to provide inconsistent application, no means of enforcement and may 
be susceptible to constitutional challenge.  Thus, the current system offers 
insufficient privacy protection. 
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d. Political Acceptability 
One benefit of the current voluntary guidelines system is that 
because it, in effect, does not require federal agencies to do anything beyond 
what they were already required to do to protect privacy, and because it does not 
impose any mandates on other, non-federal ISE participants, little political 
opposition is likely to be encountered.  Indeed, this author is unaware of any ISE 
participant challenges to the PM-ISE’s voluntary privacy guidelines.  Thus, the 
current program of voluntary guidelines is deemed highly politically acceptable.   
B. VOLUNTARILY ADOPTED MANDATORY STANDARDS 
One potential policy choice for ISE privacy protection, involving voluntarily 
adopted uniform standards, is contained in the Europol Convention and the 
Council of Europe Convention on Personal Data Processing.  These two 
European Conventions are potentially applicable to the U.S. ISE because, as 
liberal democracies, the U.S. and Europe share an enlightenment heritage, and 
legal systems that have a common basis (Bignami, 2007). 
In one illustration of that shared legal heritage, Europe and the United 
States draw on each others’ conception of privacy.  At their core, both Europe 
and the U.S. systems of law value privacy, defined as “a certain freedom from 
scrutiny of others and a certain amount of autonomy in making life decisions” 
(Bignami, 2007).  In fact, the European Data Processing Convention’s framework 
is based on the “Fair Information Practices” contained in a 1973 U.S. Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare report that also formed the basis for the U.S. 
Privacy Act of 1974 (Solove, 2008, p. 186).   
Counterterrorism measures in Europe have raised strong and widespread 
concerns about the relationship between privacy and security, especially as 
those factors relate to ensuring accountability by government authorities 
(European Security: High Level Study on Threats, Response and Relevant 
Technologies Consortium [ESSTRT], 2006).  Of particular interest is the “strong 
feeling across Europe that if [counterterrorism] responses are excessive, the 
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values of democratic societies could be undermined—thereby weakening the 
struggle against terrorism” (ESSTRT, 2006, p. 20).  Thus, there is recognition on 
the part of many Europeans that the optimal response to terrorism is neither too 
much nor too little—that privacy and security must be balanced.  Within that 
milieu, the privacy of personal data is seen as a fundamental right (Bignami, 
2007; Kochems, 2006).  The following documents reflect that recognition. 
1. European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
European concern with privacy long predated the current struggle against 
terrorism, however (Bignami, 2008).  Shortly after the end of World War II, on 
November 4, 1950, the Council of Europe adopted the world’s first legal 
document to protect human rights, the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe, n.d.). Article 8 of the 
Council of Europe Convention of 1950 firmly established privacy protection as a 
critical human right (Solove, Rotenberg, 2003, p. 688). 
Article 8—Right to respect for private and family life  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
(European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 1950) 
The first requirement of Article 8 is that any interference with the right of 
privacy be lawful. Once the interference has been determined to be in 
accordance with law, that interference must be found to be both necessary and 
intended to further one of the listed permissible purposes, which include national 
security, public safety and crime prevention (European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).[n.d.]  Article 8 recognizes that protecting 
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national security and public safety are legitimate purposes for interference with 
personal privacy rights, but it also recognizes that that legitimate interference 
with privacy must be proportional (Bignami, 2007).  
Proportionality, in turn, requires an examination as to whether action in 
question will achieve the stated purpose, whether alternative actions would 
impose a lesser burden on privacy and whether the least burdensome alternative 
nonetheless has an intolerable impact on privacy such that the action will not be 
permitted (Bignami, 2007).  In the end, in determining proportionality, the more 
important the right the higher the burden on the government; the more important 
the public purpose, the lower the burden on the government (Bignami; 2007).3 
2. European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe 
Convention on Data Protection 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms does not exist in a vacuum, however.  The provision is “given effect by 
the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and also by the 
Convention on Data Protection established by the Council of Europe in 1980” 
(Solove, Rotenberg, 2003, p. 688). 
In a 2008 paper examining the protection of privacy in counterterrorism, 
the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights examined the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and found that data protection 
                                            
3 Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which 
includes elements concerning the free flow of information, presents a further counterpoise to 
Article 8. 
Article 10—Freedom of Expression  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950). 
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principles are well developed.  According to the Commissioner for Human Rights 
(2008), for any use of Article 8 to interfere with privacy rights the ECHR requires 
a specific legal basis, with specific procedures, rather than allowing reliance on a 
broadly written statute.  However, interference with privacy rights is not 
automatically permitted just because public safety or another listed purpose is 
implicated (see Rotaru v. Romania, E.C.H.R., 2000). The ECHR applies 
“necessity” and “proportionality” considerations (discussed supra) and requires 
that “hard” (factual) and “soft” (intelligence) data should be clearly distinguished, 
especially when privacy rights of contacts and associates of a suspect, rather 
than of the suspect himself are at issue (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008).  
Information coming from private parties (such as credit reference agencies) 
requires additional safeguards and, furthermore, access to personal information 
should only be allowed on a case-by-case basis (Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2008).   
3. Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and 
associated Additional Protocol 
Drawing on the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and recognizing the immense growth of electronic data processing, in 
1981 the Council of Europe promulgated the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Data 
Processing Convention).As its title implies, the purpose of the Data Processing 
Convention is, in particular, the protection of privacy with regards to automated 
processing of personal data, without regard to nationality or state of residence; in 
that regard, the signatory parties to the Convention are required to apply various 
data protection principles and safeguards (Data Processing Convention, 1981, 
Articles 1-8).  State parties are allowed to derogate from the Convention for 
“protecting State security, public safety, the monetary interests of the State or the 
suppression of criminal offences” (Bignami, 2007; Data Processing Convention, 
1981, Article 9).  Parties to the convention are obligated to cooperate with each 
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other in implementing the convention’s provisions (Article 13), and in extending 
protections of the convention to data subjects residing abroad (Article14) (Data 
Processing Convention, 1981).  Parties are permitted to refuse requests for 
assistance in certain circumstances, including where such requests are 
incompatible with a party’s sovereignty, security or public policy (Data 
Processing Convention, 1981, Section 16).   
In late 2001, in recognition of ever-increasing cross-border information 
flows, including to and from countries that were not parties to the convention, 
improvements to the Data Processing Convention were proposed (Additional 
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data on Supervisory Authorities and 
Transborder Data Flows (2001); Additional Protocol [2001]).  Although it has not 
yet come into force, the Additional Protocol (2001) would set up a system of 
supervisory authorities set up by each party to ensure that its nation’s laws 
comply with the Data Processing Convention, and to hear claims by any person 
pertaining to privacy protection under the convention (Articles 1 and 2, 
respectively). 
4. Europol Convention  
Europol, the European Police Office, was created pursuant to a provision 
in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1992 and commenced limited 
operations in 1994 (Europol Web site, 2008).  Its original mission was to fight 
drugs, but that mission was later expanded to cover other types of crimes, 
including international crime as codified by the Europol Convention adopted in 
October 1998 (Europol Web site, 2008).   
As a primary component of its crime-fighting mission, Europol gathers, 
analyzes and shares information about criminal organizations among its member 
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nations (DiPaolo, A. and Stanislawski, B., n.d.).4  A majority of provisions of the 
Europol Convention pertain to the computerized information sharing system used 
by the organization.  In particular, Article 14(1) of the Europol Convention states 
that a member country shall 
under its national legislation, take the necessary measures in 
relation to the processing of personal data in data files in the 
framework of this Convention to ensure a standard of data 
protection which at least corresponds to the standard resulting from 
the implementation of the principles of the Council of Europe 
Convention of 28 January 1981 [Article 14(1) of the Europol 
Convention] 
Furthermore, member nations are not permitted to transfer personal data 
under the convention until the recipient member has promulgated the requisite 
national legislation (Europol Convention, Article 14(2), 1998).  Article 18 of the 
Europol Convention addresses the communication of data to third countries and 
bodies.  Personal data may be shared with third countries or bodies for the 
preventing or combating criminal offenses, where the third party has ensured an 
adequate level of data protection (Europol Convention, Article 18, 1998).5  To 
determine whether a third party’s data protection is adequate, Article 18(3) lists 
the considerations to be addressed, including “the nature of the data,” “the 
purpose for which the data is intended” and “the duration of the intended 
processing” (Europol Convention).  Article 23 mandates the designation of a 
national supervisory body to independently monitor the rights of individuals 
pertaining to data input, retrieval and communication, and it provides an express 
a right of redress petition to the national supervisory body by affected individuals.  
                                            
4 Statewatch, a European civil rights and watchdog organization notes that the Europol 
information system includes data on convicted and suspected persons, as well as “persons who 
there are serious grounds for believing will commit criminal offences,” in other words “not-yet-but-
soon-to-be suspects”  (Statewatch, p. 2). 
5 In a December 2001 agreement, and a December 2002 supplemental agreement, Europol 
and the U.S. agreed to exchange strategic, technical and personal data relating to certain criminal 
activities, including terrorist activities (Agreement between the United States of America and the 
European Police Office, 2001; and Supplemental agreement between the Europol Police Office 
and the United States of America on the exchange of personal data and related information, 
2002). 
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To further protect individual privacy rights, Article 24 of the Europol Convention 
provides for a independent, joint (i.e., multistate) supervisory body, which reviews 
Europol’s activities, including “monitor[ing] the permissibility of the transmission 
of data originating from Europol” [Article 24 of the Europol Convention, 1998] 
5. Analysis 
As previously discussed, although Europe and the United States share a 
common legal heritage and once had similar approaches to privacy law, the two 
regions of the world more recently have taken a divergent course in protecting 
the right of privacy, as evidenced by the various European privacy measures 
discussed supra.  Although American Fair Information Practices influenced 
European privacy concepts, European law expanded and adapted as technology 
became more advanced, but American privacy law did not (Bignami, 2007). 
Since the 1970s, U.S. privacy law has focused on protecting specific 
sectors of the economy, such as financial information, while European privacy 
law has broadened in scope, applying to all personally identifiable information 
without distinguishing between either the type of data uses or the public or 
private nature of the party involved in the data use in question (Bignami, 2007; 
and Solove, Rotenberg, 2003).  Both systems distinguish between the content of 
communications and the incidents of communications (e.g., lists of phone 
numbers dialed), with the U.S. protecting only the content, and Europe protecting 
both content and incidents with the proviso that surveillance of content is 
considered more intrusive than incidents in the European system (Bignami, 
2007). 
Nonetheless, “[d]ivergences between the ways different societies protect 
privacy do not necessarily stem from conceptual differences about privacy” 
(Solove, 2008, p. 185).  Solove (2008) goes on say that in the end “the degree to 
which so many countries recognize the same set of privacy problems is more 
significant than the divergences” (p. 186).  He also recognizes that there is a 
cross-fertilization of nations’ “cultural understanding of privacy” at work (Solove, 
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2008, p. 186).  Similarly, at least one commentator has argued that an increased 
convergence of approaches to the conception of privacy makes it more likely that 
the U.S. will increase its privacy protections to approach the protections provided 
by Europe (Shaffer, 2000). 
Given the common underpinnings in the conceptual understanding of 
privacy between Europe and the United States, this analysis will evaluate the 
likely effects of a theoretical implementation of a system of voluntarily adopted, 
mandatory privacy standards based on the European system. 
a. Fostering Collaboration  
Privacy is clearly, and succinctly, recognized as a critical human 
right by the Council of Europe.  The various European agreements that touch on 
privacy all flow from that central holding.   
In addition, the European agreements discussed above generally 
have well-developed procedures for cross-agency implementation.  Roles and 
responsibilities are likewise relatively well-defined.  Cultural differences between 
countries are recognized by allowing each country to interpret on its own 
application of the listed exceptions to the conventions—at a potential cost to 
consistency, as discussed below.   
A key component of the European system is the presence of 
supervisory authorities, which are “privacy agencies that are responsible for 
investigating privacy complaints, issuing annual reports, and serving as a privacy 
ombudsman” (Solove, Rotenberg, 2003, p. 731).  This system serves as both as 
a tool for monitoring the collaborative effort and as a means for enforcing 
accountability. Under this policy option, collaboration is enhanced through 
common standards of privacy protection, and procedures, including supervisory 
authorities, for implementing those standards. 
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b. Ensuring Information Sharing  
A requirement that ISE ensure that the recipient of the information 
shared has compliant privacy standards would entail an additional responsibility 
when sharing information, although the compliance status of many information 
recipients, especially ones with which the information-providing agency 
frequently shares, would likely be known in advance.  Exceptions to information 
sharing mandates and mandates to share information regardless of recipient 
privacy protections (such as in matters of national security) would also add to 
transactional costs. 
Having each participant operate under a common set of 
enforceable privacy rules that are mandatory in effect would probably improve 
coordinated multi-agency information sharing.  ISE participants may be more 
likely to share information if they believe information recipients have adequate 
privacy protections in place.  For those reasons, uniform protections would also 
tend to increase public and political support (and concomitantly, resources) for 
the ISE. 
In summary, the European system of voluntarily adopted, 
mandatory requirements that are applicable to all information-sharing participants 
appears to have a positive effect on information sharing.   
c. Protection of Privacy Rights 
1).  Constitutionality.  To the extent that ISE participants 
voluntarily agree to mandatory privacy standards, courts are more likely to find 
that adequate privacy protection is in place to permit the acquisition and use of 
personal information for law enforcement and other necessary government 
functions.  One key to challenges on this ground would be the reasonable and 
constrained use of exceptions to the prohibition of information transfers to parties 
without sufficient privacy protections in place.   
The relationship of multiple nations within Europe can be 
analogized to federal relationship of national to state governments in U.S.  One 
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potential issue with the European system that could also arise in the U.S. 
pertains to the tension between police cooperation and sovereignty.  In the area 
of internal security—presumably including threats to that security by terrorism—
European countries have been especially protective of their sovereignty 
(Storbeck, 1999).  As discussed by Storbeck (1999), the tension arises from the 
fact that maintaining internal security is too big a task for a country to provide on 
its own, but the resulting need for international cooperation requires a country to 
give up some control of its sovereignty in order to cooperate successfully.  To 
Hijmans (2006), the tension stems from a “constitutionally enshrined distrust of 
another country’s legal system” (paragraph 12).  Skinner (2002) characterizes 
the tension as being between sovereignty and the protection of policing 
traditions; he believes that the tension inherent in police cooperation treaties may 
represent the limits of cooperative efforts in the EU.  Interestingly, Skinner also 
believes that this tension has led to European police cooperation having been 
“approached through political initiatives and information sharing frameworks, 
which are deemed helpful but not damaging to sovereignty” (2002; p. 206).  
In the U.S., states also tend to be protective of their 
sovereignty.  Although this option concerns voluntarily adopted mandatory 
standards, sovereignty may become an issue in at least two ways.  First, an 
argument might be made that although adoption of the standards is nominally 
voluntary, the effect of prohibiting information sharing with non-complying 
entities—except for certain narrow exceptions—would be mandatory in nature 
and preemptive in effect.  As previously discussed, the two lines of Supreme 
Court cases concerning federalism and federal regulatory efforts would have to 
be considered.  Second, sovereignty tensions may give rise to cooperation 
issues in effectuating the standards.  Accordingly, constitutional issues are a 
possible concern with this option. 
2).  Consistency of Application.  Another issue with the 
European system concerns how information is treated in the three pillars( i.e., 
broad policy areas) (Skinner, 2002).  The first pillar addresses social and 
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economic issues, where information sharing privacy is heavily regulated.  The 
less-regulated nature of the second (foreign and security policy) and third (justice 
and home affairs), is reflected, as discussed above, in exceptions to privacy 
protection provisions for security, public safety and criminal enforcement in the 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Data 
Protection Convention and national interest in the case of the Europol 
Convention.  Countries are permitted to interpret the application of the exceptions 
using their own laws, thereby potentially leading to inconsistency in application 
(Guymon, 2000).  Another potential consistency issue with use of the European 
system for national supervisory bodies in the ISE context is that although at least 
nominally independent, their powers vary (Bignami, 2007).   
Even in the case of the more heavily regulated first pillar 
data flows, the issue of “the lack of enforcement action appears to be creating a 
gap between law and practice” in the area of cross-border privacy protection 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2006, p. 
19).  The gap stems from “insufficient preventive or remedial powers, 
inconsistent legal regimes, and practical obstacles like resource constraints” 
(OECD, 2006, p. 3). 
In summary, the European system suffers from certain 
inconsistencies that should be considered when implementing privacy 
protections standards for the ISE. 
3).  Enforceability.  The European system is based on 
common standards, which once voluntarily adopted by means of becoming a 
party to a convention, are mandatory in effect.  Nations are required to amend 
their domestic law to the extent necessary to meet the common privacy standard.  
Compliance is effectuated by several methods.  First, countries are required to 
have an internal independent supervisory body to monitor privacy rights and to 
act as a place where requests for redress can be heard.  Second, a joint 
multilateral supervisory body is empowered to ensure compliance with the 
common standards and resolve disputes between signatory parties.  Finally, 
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individual parties are restricted from transferring data to any party or non-party 
who has insufficient privacy protections in place, with limited exceptions where 
national interest necessitates such a transfer notwithstanding privacy 
considerations (Bignami, 2007).6   
Privacy protections in the European system are highly 
enforceable.  Beyond the general mandatory effect of the privacy standards, 
compliance with those standards is enforced through an internal supervisory 
body, a multilateral supervisory body and restrictions on data transfer to non-
complying parties. 
d. Political Acceptability 
Although mandatory in effect, privacy standards under this policy 
option would still be implemented on a voluntary basis by each ISE participant.  
To the extent that this voluntary system would be seen by ISE participants as, in 
reality, mandatory in effect, political resistance is likely to be increased.  The 
issue of political acceptability under this policy option would be compounded by 
the necessity for each ISE participant to agree to the mandatory standards.  In 
other words, the political acceptability of the program to each implementing 
jurisdiction would have to be ascertained. 
Would the resultant system, in Bardach’s words, at least not be “too 
unacceptable?”  As with any such undertaking, the answer to that question would 
depend on the totality of factors at work at the time the system is considered. 
C. FEDERALLY MANDATED PRIVACY STANDARDS 
The following three federal statutory or regulatory schemes are illustrative 
of programs where the federal government has mandated the use of uniform 
privacy protection by non-federal entities, including other forms of government.   
 
                                            
6 It should be noted that this exception concerns the transferor nation’s interest and not the 
interests of the putative transferee nation. 
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Two of the schemes specifically provide for preemption of state law in certain 
circumstance, and all three schemes provide examples of various methods to 
enforce compliance with their provisions. 
1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 
U.S.C. § 1301, et seq.) 
a. Background 
Similar to the current situation concerning privacy law, until the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was passed, 
“personal health information was protected by a patchwork of federal and state 
laws” (Gosfield, 2002).  HIPAA was the “first comprehensive federal protection 
for the privacy” of certain health information (Gosfield, 2002).   
Title II of HIPAA, known as the Administrative Simplification 
provisions, inter alia, required that the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Service (HHS) promulgate national standards for health care information privacy 
(HHS, 2003).7  The resultant privacy standards, known as the Privacy Rule, 
came into effect starting in 2003 (HHS, 2003). 
The Privacy Rule applies to any person or organization (“covered 
entities”) and persons or organizations (“business associates”) that perform 
certain activities or functions for covered entities, involving  individually 
identifiable health information (called “protected health information” or “PHI”) 
(HHS, 2003).  PHI covers a broad range of health information, including a 
patient’s name, social security number, date of birth or any information that could 
be used to identify a patient (Gosfield, 2002).  Health information that has been 
“de-identified” may be used or otherwise disclosed without restriction (HHS, 
2003).    
                                            
7 This requirement would only come into effect if Congress did not enact its own privacy 
legislation within three years of HIPAA’s passage.  Congress did not do so; accordingly, HHS’s 
Privacy Rule was later issued. 
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In essence, the Privacy Rule is designed to limit the circumstances 
under which covered entities may disclose PHI.  A basic principle of the Privacy 
Rule is that a covered entity may only use, disclose or request only the minimum 
necessary amount of information that is needed to accomplish its purpose (HHS, 
2003). PHI may only be used or disclosed if the Privacy Rule allows or requires 
it, or if the subject of the PHI give written authorization to do so (HHS, 2003).   
Disclosure is required when requested by the subject of the PHI (or the subject’s 
representative), or to HHS for compliance investigation and reviews or 
enforcement action (HHS, 2003).      
Disclosure is permitted in several cases, including for treatment or 
when it is in the public interest (HHS, 2003). Disclosure is also permitted in 
response to court order or to law enforcement officials for law enforcement 
purposes (HHS, 2003).  In addition, authorization is not required to use or 
disclose information for certain essential government functions, including military 
missions and intelligence and national security activities (HHS, 2003).    
b. State Law Preemption 
HIPAA, through the Privacy Rule, generally preempts contrary state 
laws (HHS, 2003).  For the purposes of the Privacy Rule, “contrary” means that 
compliance by the covered entity with both the state law in question and federal 
requirements would be impossible, or the state law is “an obstacle to 
accomplishing the full purposes and objectives” of HIPAA (HHS, 2003, p. 17).  
There are some exceptions to preemption of contrary state law, though.  State 
laws that provide greater privacy protections or rights with respect to PHI are 
permitted, as are state laws that pertain to the reporting of “disease or injury, 
child abuse, birth, or death,” for certain public health reasons or for certain health 
plan reporting (HHS, 2003, p. 17).  Other reasons include HHS determinations 




public health, safety, or welfare need,” and, if a privacy rule provision is involved, 
the HHS Secretary determines that, on balance, the privacy intrusion is 
warranted (HHS, 2003, p. 17).   
c. Compliance 
In enforcing the Privacy Rule, HHS first seeks the cooperation of 
covered entities, in some case providing assistance to promote voluntary 
compliance (HHS, 2003).  Persons are permitted to file complaints under the 
Privacy Rule, and covered entities must cooperate in the investigation or review 
of those complaints (HHS, 2003). Failure to comply with a requirement of the 
Privacy Rule may subject a covered entity to a civil penalty of $100 per violation, 
up to $25,000 per year for multiple violations of the same Privacy Rule provision 
(HHS, 2003).  Civil penalties are not imposed where the “violation is due to 
reasonable cause and did not involve willful neglect,” and the covered entity 
corrects the violation in a timely manner (HHS, 2003, p. 17).  Criminal penalties 
of up to a year in prison and a $50,000 fine are reserved for case where a person 
knowingly obtains or discloses PHI in violation of HIPAA (HHS, 2003).   
2. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Part 23, Criminal 
Intelligence Systems Operating Policies (28 C.F.R. Part 23) 
a. Background 
Promulgated in 1993, the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating 
Procedures (28 C.F.R. Part 23; Part 23) were intended to ensure that all criminal 
intelligence systems receiving federal funds under the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 protected the privacy and other constitutional rights 
of individuals.  “Criminal Intelligence Systems, for the purposes of Part 23, 
includes “arrangements, equipment, facilities, and procedures used for the 
receipt, storage, interagency exchange or dissemination, and analysis of criminal 
intelligence information (§ 23.3(b)(1)).  “Criminal Intelligence Information” is 
defined, in turn, as evaluated data that meets system submission criteria and is  
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“relevant to the identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an 
individual who or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in 
criminal activity” (§ 23.3(b)(3)). 
Part 23 justifies policy guidelines for federally funded projects on 
the grounds that “the collection and exchange of intelligence data necessary to 
support control of serious criminal activity may represents potential threats to the 
privacy of individuals to whom such data relates” (§ 23.2).   
b. Privacy Principles 
Among the provisions of Part 23 (1993) pertaining to privacy and 
information sharing is a prohibition of information which is in violation of any 
federal, state or local law (§ 23.20(d)).  In multi-jurisdictional systems, the funded 
system is responsible for ensuring that no violative information enters the 
system, either by examining supporting information from the submitting agency, 
or by properly delegating the responsibility to a participating agency, who is 
subject to inspection and audit procedures ((§ 23.20(d)).  Dissemination of 
criminal intelligence information is on a “need to know” or “right to know” basis (§ 
23.20(e)).  Furthermore, dissemination is permitted only to agencies that agree to 
follow information procedures consistent with Part 23, except when necessary to 
“imminent danger to life or property” (§§ 23.20(f)(1) and (f)(2)).  The grant-making 
agency must approve a formal information exchange procedures with other 
information systems (§ 23.20(j)).   
c. Enforcement 
Sanctions must be adopted for unauthorized use or disclosure of 
information in the system (§ 23.20(m)), and the system must conduct inspections 
and audits of participating agencies (§ 23.20(n)).  However, the Attorney General 
is permitted to waive any requirement in Part 23: 
upon a clear and convincing showing that such waiver would 
enhance the collection, maintenance or dissemination of 
information in the criminal intelligence system, while ensuring that 
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such system would not be utilized in violation of the privacy and 
constitutional rights of individuals or any applicable state or federal 
law (§ 23.20(o)). 
In order to receive funding, intelligence systems must agree to 
adhere to all requirements in § 23.20 (§ 23.30).  In addition, funded projects must 
meet certain criteria, including that they be multi-jurisdictional ((§ 23.30(b)(3)) 
and that a designated official will retain control and supervision of information 
collection and dissemination (§ 23.30(c)).  In addition, the designated official 
must certify in writing that the official takes full responsibility and accountability 
for any information used or shared (§ 23.30(c)).  Similar requirements apply to 
actions taken on behalf of a joint entity (§ 23.30(d)).  Funded systems are subject 
to monitoring and audit, and funding requires compliance with the provisions of § 
23.20 (§ 23.40).  
3. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-
2725) 
a. Background 
Passed as an amendment to the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 2004, the Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) was 
originally intended as an anti-stalking measure (Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, n.d.).  The DPPA prohibits a state department of motor vehicles ( or 
employee or contractor thereof) from knowingly disclosing or making available 
any personal information obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record, 
subject to certain exceptions (DPPA, § 2721(a)(1)).  The release or use of “highly 
restricted” personal information requires express consent, subject to a more 
limited number of exceptions than for non-highly restricted personal information 
(DPPA, § 2721(a)(2)).   
“Personal information” includes any information that identifies an 
individual, except information on a person’s ZIP code, accidents, driving 
violations or driver’s status (DPPA, § 2725(3)).  “Highly restricted personal 
information” refers to a person’s photograph, social security number or a 
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person’s medical or disability information (DPPA, § 2725(4)).  “Motor vehicle 
record” means any record pertaining to a driver’s license, vehicle title or 
registration or motor vehicle division-issued identification card (DPPA, § 
2725(1)).  “Express consent” is defined as written consent, including electronic 
signatures (DPPA, § 2725(5)).   
b. Privacy Principles 
The DPPA provides for several exceptions to the general 
prohibition of release and use of certain motor vehicle records.  Permissible uses 
for both “personal information” and “highly restricted personal information” 
include use for government functions (§ 2721(b)(1)), use in legal proceedings (§ 
2721(b)(4)), use in certain insurance matters (§ 2721(b)(6)) and use related to a 
commercial driver’s license (§ 2721(b)(9)) (DPPA). Permissible uses of “personal 
information” add such matters as motor vehicle or driver safety or theft (§ 
2721(b)(2)), use by legitimate businesses for verifying the accuracy of 
information submitted by the individual (§ 2721(b)(3)) and other use specifically 
authorize by state law, if that use is related to motor vehicle operation or public 
safety (§ 2721(b)(14)) (DPPA).   Resale and redisclosure of personal information 
is restricted (DPPA, § 2721(c)).  Requests for uses not otherwise provided for 
may be permitted if a state motor vehicle department requests and receives an 
individual’s privacy waiver DPPA, § 2721(d)).  States are not permitted to 
condition issuance of an individual’s record on receiving express consent DPPA, 
§ 2721(d)). 
c. Enforcement 
DPAA makes it unlawful to obtain or disclose information for any 
use not permitted (§ 2722(a)) or by means of a false representation (§ 2722(b)).  
Knowing violations of DPAA are subject to a criminal fine (§ 2723(a)).  In 
addition, the U.S. Attorney General is authorized to impose a civil penalty of up to 
$5,000 for “substantial noncompliance” with DPAA by a state department of 
motor vehicles (§ 2723(b)).  DPAA also provides for a private right action to bring 
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a civil suit in a U.S. District Court and allows that court to award actual damages, 
punitive damages, attorney’s fees and other litigation costs and preliminary and 
equitable relief (§ 2724(a) and (b)).   
d. Constitutional Challenge 
Not too long after its effective date, DPPA was the subject of 
several state challenges, one of which reached the U.S. Supreme Court.  The 
state of South Carolina challenged DPAA as violative of the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.8  In Reno v. Condon, a unanimous U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Fourth Circuit of Appeals that had held 
that DPAA violated constitutional principles of federalism,9 thereby upholding the 
validity of DPPA (528 U.S.141, 147-148 (2000)).  South Carolina’s law conflicted 
with DPPA’s provisions in that the state law permitted dissemination of motor 
vehicle records upon written request and a confirmation that the requested 
records would not be used for telephone solicitation (528 U.S. at 147).   
The court found that because drivers’ personal information 
sufficiently impacts interstate commerce, a “constitutional base for federal 
legislation” was created (528 U.S. at 148-149), but that finding, in itself, did not 
resolve the issue of DPPA’s constitutionality (528 U.S. at 149).  The court 
recounted prior cases which invalidated federal statutes on the ground that, as 
related in one such case, “Congress commandeered the state legislative process 
by requiring a state legislature to enact a particular kind of law” (528 U.S. at 149).   
Nonetheless, the court held that a decision in another case, South 
Carolina v. Baker (485 U.S. 505 (1988)), actually governed the case at hand (528 
                                            
8 The Tenth Amendment, also known as the “Reserved Powers Clause,” reads, “The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, not prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  The Eleventh Amendment, pertaining to 
State sovereign immunity, states, “The Judicial Power of  the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  [Tenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution]. 
9 The U.S. system of government where power is divided between the federal government 
and the states. 
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U.S. at 150).  In Baker, the court upheld a federal statute prohibiting states from 
issuing unregistered bonds “because the law ‘regulated state activities,’ rather 
than ‘seeking to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private 
parties’” (528 U.S. at 150 [internal citation omitted]).  In that case, the court 
stated, “[a]ny federal regulation demands compliance.  That a State wishing to 
engage in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative 
action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace 
that presents no constitutional defect” (528 U.S. at 150-151 [internal citation 
omitted]).   
The court likened DPPA to the statute at issue in Baker, stating:  
DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to 
regulate their own citizens.  The DPPA regulates the States as the 
owners of databases.  It does not require the South Carolina 
Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require 
state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes 
regulating private individuals. (528 U.S. at 151) 
Thus, the court also found that DPPA was not at odds with the line 
of cases that prohibit “commandeering” of the state legislative process (528 U.S. 
at 151).  Finally, the court stated that it did not need to address the state’s 
argument that “Congress may only regulate the States by means of ‘generally 
applicable’ laws” because the court found DPPA to be generally applicable in that 
it does not regulate states exclusively (528 U.S. at 151).    
4. Analysis 
a. Fostering Collaboration  
If judged by the criteria adopted from those used by the GAO, this 
policy option has the potential to increase collaboration, though perhaps not 
voluntary collaboration per se. In imposing mandatory privacy protection 
standards, the federal government would have at least some latitude in deciding 
on the common outcome sought along with the strategies used to achieve that 
outcome.  Roles and responsibilities—including, presumably, a federal agency or 
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executive in a leadership role—could be specified.  Because there would be one 
set of procedures, they would, by definition, be compatible—at least internally.  
Reporting and evaluative mechanisms, as in the Justice Department regulations, 
could be used to ensure individual and agency accountability.  By these 
measures, federally imposed mandatory standards would increase collaboration. 
In a broader sense, though, collaboration relies to a significant 
degree on the voluntary cooperation of parties to work together.  This relates to 
the GAO collaboration criterion concerning agreement on roles and 
responsibilities.  Mandatorily imposed standards by their very nature do not rely 
on voluntary cooperation to either promulgate or implement.  As unilateral 
standards, in effect, act to impose the will of the federal government rather than 
reflect the agreement of all ISE participants on their roles and responsibilities, 
such standards may actually work to decrease collaboration in the ISE.   
b. Ensuring Information Sharing  
On their face, federally imposed mandatory privacy protection 
standards would seem to have at worst a neutral effect on information sharing.  
As with the collaboration criterion, though, while mandatory standards might be 
fully capable of ensuring a coordinated multi-agency perspective and efficient 
and effective dissemination of information—at least on paper—in practice it might 
not be as effective.  Would ISE participants be as motivated when working under 
a system of a federal unilateral mandate as they would in a system where they 
would set their own standards to actually, in the ISE-PM’s words, “achieve a 
coordinated multi-agency perspective?”  [emphasis added].  Again, the term 
“sharing” seems to imply a sense of inherent “voluntariness” that might not be 
realized if standards are imposed on a resistive ISE membership. 
c. Protection of Privacy Rights 
1).  Constitutionality.  It is likely that uniform, mandatory 
privacy protection standards, at least if they are based on commonly accepted 
protection principles, will be upheld by the courts as a necessary exercise of 
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government power.  At the very least, the federal government’s reasonable 
exercise of authority in issuing standards should be treated with considerable 
deference by the courts. 
Just as likely, is that there will be challenges to the 
standards on federalism grounds.  As previously discussed, the Supreme Court 
has treated federal efforts to impose requirements on states in one of two ways—
either as an impermissible usurpation of state legislative authority or a 
permissible exercise of power to regulate state activities.  Arguments similar to 
those in Reno v. Condon should be anticipated.  Treatment of the mandatory 
standards by the courts will depend on many factors, not the least of which will 
be the operative effect of the standard itself. 
2).  Consistency of Application.  This policy option, by its 
mandatory nature, would maximize the consistency of privacy protection 
standards used by ISE participants.  As stated before, however, consistency in 
actual application may have practical limits, depending on, for example, whether 
exceptions to the standards are allowed and how those exceptions are 
interpreted.  Also, if the HIPPA approach to preemption is followed, states would 
be permitted to retain their own privacy rules unless specifically contrary to the 
federal act. 
3).  Enforceability.  Drawing on the three examples used to 
illustrate this policy option, the federal government has a range of enforcement 
options from which to choose.  HIPPA uses civil and criminal penalties are 
provided for, although voluntary cooperation is encouraged.  The Part 23 
regulations rely on participating systems to adopt their own sanctions program, 
and the regulations also require adherence to all regulatory requirements in order 
to receive federal funding.  There is also a monitoring and audit program for 
funded systems.  Enforcement of DPPA is based on a system of criminal fines, 
civil penalties and a private right of action in federal court for aggrieved parties. 
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4).  Political Acceptability.  Strictly speaking, adoption of this 
policy option would require implementation by only one entity, either the U.S. 
Congress for a statute, or a federal agency in the case of a regulation.  However, 
this policy option could, like DPPA, potentially be the subject of resistance by 
non-federal members of the ISE.  This resistance could take the form of intense 
political pressure pre-passage (statute) or pre-adoption (regulation) or post-
implementation court challenges, as discussed above. 
Again, the question is whether this option is not “too 
unacceptable?”  And, again, the answer to that question would depend on the 
totality of factors at work at the time the system is considered. 
 66
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67
V. PROJECTED OUTCOMES 
Given the widely recognized need to share information, it is reasonable to 
believe that a certain level of information sharing will occur regardless of the 
policy option chosen.  Nonetheless, sharing might be maximized where 
participants will know that the information they share will be treated by the 
recipient in compliance with uniform standards, which could simultaneously 
increase the security of the information in addition to protecting privacy.   
Because the intent of the ISE is to share information among all ISE 
participants, shared information should not be subject to varying levels of privacy 
protection dependent upon which ISE participant is in possession of that 
information at any given time.  Thus, all ISE participants should be subject to the 
same privacy protection standards.   
Specifically, instead of general guidelines for piecemeal implementation by 
the various members of the ISE, there should be uniform privacy protection 
standards that apply to all parties that make up the ISE.  Second, in order to be 
effective, compliance with the privacy protection standards should be mandatory 
rather than optional, thus ensuring that the standards are not only uniform in and 
of themselves, but are consistently implemented.   
The projected relative outcomes of the ability of the three policy 
alternatives analyzed to meet these criteria are summarized in the following table 








Table 1.   Projected Relative Outcomes for Three Alternative Privacy Protection 












































































































As can be readily seen from Table 1, no policy alternative has established 
dominance, defined as an alternative that is expected to achieve a better 
outcome for every criterion measured.  However, the voluntarily adopted 
mandatory standards alternative shows a better outcome than the status quo 
voluntary guidelines alternative for every criterion except for that of political 
acceptability. 
The criteria used present a classic multi-attribute problem in that they are 
not susceptible to commensurable weighting units across the criteria.  
Nonetheless, the political acceptability criterion, while important to the analysis, 
does not in itself go to the core of the desired outcome for the ISE.  Instead, the 
political acceptability criterion goes to how difficult a particular alternative would 
be to bring into force.  As such, the political acceptability criterion can be given 
less relative weight than the other criteria. 
Given that the voluntary guidelines alternative rates lower than the 
voluntarily adopted mandatory standards alternative for all other criteria, the 
voluntary guidelines alternative is clearly dominated by at least the voluntarily 
adopted mandatory standards alternative and justifiably can be eliminated as a 
weaker alternative.  Nonetheless, the projected outcomes of the voluntary 
guidelines alternative can serve as a benchmark, or “base case,” for the 
remaining two alternatives.   
Leaving aside political acceptability, a clear delineation between the 
alternatives of voluntarily adopted mandatory standards and federally imposed, 
mandatory standards emerges.  In two of the primary criterion espoused as 
central to the ISE, fostering collaboration and ensuring information sharing, 
voluntarily adopted mandatory standards is projected to have a better outcome.  
Conversely, the federally imposed mandatory standard has an overall better 
outcome for the majority of the criteria that comprise the ISE goal of privacy 
protection:  constitutionality, consistency of application, and enforceability. 
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It seems almost axiomatic that a single set of privacy protection standards, 
mandatory in effect and promulgated by a single entity—in this case the federal 
government—would provide greater consistency in the application of those 
standards.  Similarly, given the range of enforcement mechanisms available to 
the federal government, a single-source enforcer of privacy standards would also 
seem to maximize the outcome of the enforceability criterion.   
Of the three criteria that make up overall privacy protection goal of the 
ISE, only in susceptibility to constitutional challenge would the federally imposed 
mandatory standards alternative cede any ground to voluntarily adopted 
mandatory standards.  And even in that regard, a carefully crafted regulation or 
statute should be able to obviate many if not all federalism concerns.  This could 
be accomplished through careful characterization of the standards scheme so 
that it would fall within the line of Supreme Court cases upholding federal 
regulation. 
As previously mentioned, the main superiority of the voluntarily adopted 
mandatory standards lies, in essence, in maximizing the inherent raison d'etre of 
the ISE—fostering collaboration and ensuring information.  These are the very 
elements found to be deficient by the 9/11 Commission and other commentators 
and widely acknowledged to be critical to responding to future terrorist threats. 
The areas of relative weakness of the federally imposed mandatory 
standards—in the final assessment—all revolve around the potential impact of 
the alternative on the relationship between the federal government and the state, 
local and tribal governments that constitute a large portion of the ISE as a whole.  
It seems incongruous to impose unilateral requirements on a community, for that 
is what it is, that is intended to be operated on the basis of cooperation and, at 
least impliedly, also on the basis of the comity that is intended to be the essence 
of the federalist system of government. 
Admittedly, the voluntarily adopted mandatory standards alternative would 
not promise the same level of consistency and enforceability that the federally 
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imposed mandatory alternative offers.  However, even without resorting to its 
relative superior political acceptability, in toto the balance of all the other criteria 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
A. RECOMMENDATION 
This thesis recommends that the ISE implement uniform national privacy 
standards that once voluntarily adopted by ISE participants would become 
mandatory in application.  In particular, ISE privacy standards should include: 
1. Uniform standards that apply to all ISE participants; 
2. Restrictions on data transfer by ISE participants to other parties 
that do not have adequate privacy protections in place and 
3. Provisions that are legally enforceable in the courts. 
As stated by Bignami (2008), “[b]ecause human rights inhere in individuals 
as human beings, not as citizens of one nation or another, they should not vary 
depending on geography.  They should give rise to the same treatment 
everywhere” (p. 247).  The principles of human rights—including privacy rights—
that apply to citizens of the various nations should likewise apply to the citizens 
of the various states within the United States.  One’s privacy rights as an 
American citizen should not depend on whether one is a resident of California, or 
New York or Texas. 
Instead of general guidelines for piecemeal implementation by the various 
members of the ISE, there should be uniform privacy protection standards that 
apply to all parties that make up the ISE.  These standards, preferably developed 
by the ISE members themselves, would, as previously discussed, be voluntarily 
adopted.   
However, to ensure that the voluntary uniform standards are consistently 
applied, compliance with the privacy protection standards should be made a 
condition of participation in the ISE.  Information sharing with non-participating 
entities would be restricted.10  In addition, as part of the implementation process, 
                                            
10 Restrictions could include, for example, redacted or scrubbed information, use restrictions, 
or technical controls. 
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consideration should be given to setting up an independent, joint (i.e., multistate) 
supervisory body to oversee compliance with the standards and to address 
disputes between ISE participants. 
It is possible, that despite being voluntarily adopted, that some members 
of the ISE will object to having mandated privacy standards on the grounds that 
the standards would impose an unreasonable burden on their sharing of 
information and, possibly, as a violation of the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, which concerns powers reserved to the states. 
The response to these potential challenges would be multi-fold in nature.  
First, ISE members’ support of the ISE privacy standards would be enhanced, if 
those members have a say in the formulation of the standards.  A possible model 
for a collaborative and inclusive approach to setting standards, discussed further 
infra, is the Capabilities-Based Preparedness Process, a part of the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (2007).   
Another response to challenges to the proposed privacy standards would 
include an appeal to interests of the ISE members—namely, by ensuring that the 
members have a clear understanding of the benefits that uniform privacy 
protection standards would provide to the ISE.  First, one could argue that by 
increasing the protection of information for one purpose, privacy in this case, that 
protection of that information for another purpose—operational or tactical 
security—is simultaneously advanced, at least to the extent that disclosure for 
any reason is better controlled.  Second, a robust, effective and mandatory 
system for ISE privacy protection would likely mitigate potential resistance from 
privacy advocates regarding how information is being obtained, used and shared 
by ISE members. Third, uniform privacy protection standards would thus 
simultaneously increase public trust in the purpose and actions of the ISE as a 
whole.   
Similarly, privacy standards would also assuage any related concerns by 
the various legislative bodies controlling ISE members, possibly paving the way 
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for even better support of ISE by that branch of government.  In addition, an 
effective system of privacy protection would assist ISE members in defending 
their actions impacting privacy in a court of law, thereby reducing legal 
challenges that could sap their agency’s resources in defending, and that could 
also result in potential adverse rulings.  In addition, some members of the ISE 
might be more likely to share information with other members of the ISE if privacy 
protection of that information is assured by uniform and enforceable standards.  
Most importantly, standardized privacy protections would help ensure that 
constitutional values are not sacrificed or compromised.  A concomitant benefit of 
privacy standards would be to help define the still unsettled jurisprudential 
concept of informational privacy—with potential benefits far beyond the confines 
of the ISE. 
Benefits of a uniform system of privacy protection could also be seen in 
the sharing of information with the nation’s international counterterrorism 
partners.  As a general matter, European nations do not believe that the U.S. 
currently meets European personal data-privacy protection requirements 
(Kochem, 2006).  This has led to “strained relations between Europe and the 
United States and ha[s] frustrated transatlantic cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism” (Bignami, 2007, p. 662).  Indeed, even the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security has noted increased pressure to cooperate with international 
anti-terrorism partners and has recognized the need to build trust between 
nations with different privacy regimes (DHS Privacy Office, 2007). 
Finally, the privacy protection standards should be legally enforceable.  
Judicial redress for violations of the standards should be available to both 
aggrieved members of the ISE as well as individuals, the latter known as a 
private right of action.  Federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over 
actions brought to enforce the privacy standards, as those standards will apply 
nationally; and this would avoid possibly conflicting rulings if the actions were 
allowed to be brought in the various state courts. 
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Courts should be able to choose from an array of possible sanctions, as 
appropriate to the case at hand.  The available remedies should include 
monetary sanctions, declaratory relief (a determination of rights under the 
standards), damages to the aggrieved party, injunctions to halt violative behavior 
and orders of specific performance (orders to a party to perform a specific act, 
such as comply with a statute).  In addition, in the case of private litigants, the 
courts should have the authority to award attorneys’ fees where an ISE member 
is found to have violated the standards.   
These procedures could possibly be combined with a process to quickly 
resolve cases where an ISE member is found by the court to have fully complied 
with the privacy standards, perhaps through an expedited summary judgment 
process.  Perhaps this proposal could be implemented by an external 
commission—composed of representative ISE members and other stakeholders, 
such as privacy watchdog groups—that would both guide ISE members’ 
implementation of the standards and resolve conflicts in implementation of those 
standards by ISE members. 
In summary, by successfully identifying appropriate privacy protections 
and ensuring the uniform and mandatory application of those protections to all 
members of the ISE, homeland security and the protection of individual rights 
and liberties can both be advanced. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis recommends use of voluntarily adopted mandatory privacy 
standards, based on privacy protection systems used by several European 
conventions and agreements.  As discussed supra, the United States and 
Europe share a common legal heritage, which includes recognition of the need to 
protect privacy rights.  However, protection standards have diverged in the U.S. 
and Europe since the 1970s, with European law generally providing broader 
privacy protection. 
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Underlying the European system is the general right for individuals to seek 
damages granted by the various conventions, whereas in the United States 
privacy-based actions are more often grounded in general tort (i.e., non-
contractual wrongs) law (Solove, Rotenberg, 2003).  The issue with pursuing 
privacy actions under a tort theory is that damages commonly suffered in such 
cases are not of a type normally recognized in tort jurisprudence (Solove, 
Rotenberg, 2003).   
Thus, research is needed to determine whether a U.S. system of privacy 
protection for the ISE could, or should, account for differences in the underlying 
treatment of privacy rights in the two systems.   
Next, as discussed in the “Scope” section, this thesis does not prescribe 
what the privacy standards themselves should look like.  Nonetheless, future 
research should consider, as part of the privacy standards-setting process, 
whether information privacy as it is used in the ISE should be specifically 
delineated.  Appendix A contains a short discussion of a proposed new 
classification of information privacy for the ISE. 
Finally, research is needed on the means by which a collaborative process 
could be most effectively used to enable ISE participants to create a set of 
privacy standards.  A discussion of the complexities of privacy protection 
standards and the ISE and the use of a multi-lateral approach to address those 
complexities is proposed in Appendix B. 
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APPENDIX A. CLASSIFYING INFORMATION SHARING 
ENVIRONMENT PRIVACY 
As uniform privacy protection standards are developed, the ISE should 
consider including in those standards a new classification of information privacy.  
Similar to HIPAA’s use of the term Personal Health Information (PHI) to delineate 
a specific set of personal information that is subject to the privacy protection 
provisions of the statute, specifying and classifying the information to be 
protected in the ISE would help advance privacy protection efforts. 
First, as there is no commonly accepted definition of privacy, by 
concentrating on the types of information that need protection, the often 
unavailing debate of what privacy as a general concept means can be avoided 
and on the focus can turn to the specific privacy problems to either avoid or 
address.  Such a classification is beneficial both in the creation of ISE privacy 
standards and in their eventual implementation and enforcement by providing a 
concrete and common base for interpretation of the standards. 
Once the type of information sought to be protected in the ISE is 
classified, consideration should be given to the type of protection this 
classification of information warrants.  In this regard, the thesis proposes a new 
concept of information privacy tailored to the ISE.  This classification, in effect, 
would be a hybrid, containing legal characteristics of both public information and 
private information.   
This concept, which this author terms “Information Sharing Privacy” or 
“ISP,” will provide more privacy protection than is currently accorded to 
information considered “public,” but at the same time it would permit limited 
sharing of information necessary for law enforcement or homeland security 
purposes.  In essence, ISP will respect the concept of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy—and, in fact, somewhat expand its coverage—while recognizing a 
countervailing and compelling governmental interest in sharing homeland  
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security information.  This concept, along with the proposal for classification of 
information to be protected in the ISE, would be fruitful topics for further 
development and study. 
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APPENDIX B. ADDRESSING ISE COMPLEXITIES THROUGH A 
MULTI-SECTOR COLLABORATIVE EFFORT 
The lack of consensus about the definition of privacy and the operational 
parameters of the right of information privacy together comprise an issue where 
“multiple perspectives jostle for prominence” (Snowden, Boone, n.d.).  Thus, in 
applying the Cynefin framework, as discussed in Bellavita (2006) and Snowden, 
Boone (n.d.), this issue falls squarely within the “disordered” domain of that 
framework.  Similarly, this is a place where there is “insufficient stakeholder 
agreement about how to make sense of a particular homeland security issue” 
(Bellavita, 2006, p. 6).  
Must this issue be addressable only in the relatively intractable realm of 
disorder?  Not necessarily.  As Solove (2008), posits, the elusiveness of a single, 
widely accepted definition of privacy can be sidestepped by recognizing that 
there can be different forms of privacy, related within each form in a familial 
sense, rather than by continuing the usual, but unavailing approach that seeks to 
isolate a characteristic of privacy that is common to all usages.  The key to this 
taxonomic framework is that privacy is considered in a contextual manner—by 
conceptualizing privacy by means of “focusing on the specific types of disruption” 
that a particular invasion of privacy engenders (Solove, 2008, p. 9).   
If, as Solove argues, one can conceptualize privacy from the bottom up by 
focusing on privacy problems (2008, pp. 8–9), can the reader then feel free to 
“agree to disagree” on the exact definition of privacy, and just concentrate on 
addressing its attendant problems, thereby avoiding the disordered realm 
altogether?  Not only is this approach possible, at least in the present context, 
but perhaps this approach would avoid inefficient and unnecessary conflict in the 
ISE.  As Bellavita recognizes, the first leadership task is to determine “whether 
an issue can be ordered … or whether the issue’s organic state is unorder, and 
we are wasting our time and resources trying” to do so (2006, p. 15).  Snowden 
and Boone (n.d.) implicitly recognize this approach in suggesting that disordered 
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problems might be avoided by “break[ing] down the [disordered] situation into 
constituent parts and assign[ing] each to one of the other four realms” (p. 6 of 
printout). 
Applying that suggestion to the issue of the lack of mandatory privacy 
standards in the ISE, several domains are at play. Applying the Solove model of 
a contextual, problem-based privacy conceptualization, perhaps then privacy 
problems and concomitant effects could be reduced to the “simple” realm where 
cause and effect is known.  For example, if the privacy of one’s social security 
number is not adequately protected, one stands to be the victim of identity theft.   
The remaining constituent parts are considered next.  According to 
Bellavita, some “knowable,” also known as “complicated,” issues would also be 
implicated by this issue, namely “fusing intelligence information” and “creating 
collaborative networks” (2006, p. 8).  In addition, the various issues attendant to 
standards—such as those concerning their development, adoption and 
enforcement—fall within the “complex” realm: the domain of emergent problems. 
Homeland security is commonly recognized as a complex adaptive 
system.  In the author’s view, homeland security is actually a system of complex 
adaptive systems or subsystems.  As demonstrated, the arena of privacy and the 
ISE could fairly be considered to be one of those complex subsystems. 
Thus, although the topic of privacy and the ISE falls within the “disordered” 
realm, the topic can be broken down into “simple,” “complicated” and “complex” 
parts.  Nonetheless, the complex realm is the dominant feature of the 
components because the ultimate issue within this topic is that of standards.  The 
other realms involved, “simple” and “complicated,” represent the bases for the 
desired end product—privacy standards. 
A. MULTI-SECTOR IMPERATIVE 
How, then, should privacy standards in the ISE be approached?  In the 
complex realm “best practice is replaced by smart practice, emergent practice, or 
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novel practice” (Bellavita, 2006, p. 15). Also drawing on the concept of 
emergence, Snowden, Boone (n.d.) believe that the “right approach for a 
complex context” is to allow “solutions to emerge from the community itself rather 
than try to impose them” (p. 5 of printout). In addition, they believe that there are 
instances in which a leader must share power and rely on group wisdom, 
patiently allowing the solution to emerge (Snowden, Boone, n.d.). 
According to the authors of Megacommunities, relying on group wisdom, 
known as the megacommunity approach, is particularly appropriate for dynamic 
issues that do not have a clear solution (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, and 
Kelly, 2008).  The megacommunity approach, as its name implies, takes an 
expansive view of group involvement by bringing together government, business 
and non-governmental organization (referred to as “civil society” in the book) 
sectors.   
Each sector brings its own strengths and weaknesses to the community 
and the resultant grouping gets its energy from the inherent tension between the 
groups—so-called “swarm intelligence”—that allows the creation of novel or 
emergent practice (Gerencser et al., 2008, pp. 66-67).  A megacommunity in 
action thus provides an illustration of the benefits of Bellavita’s (2006) admonition 
to use the properties of complexity to advantage in addressing HLS process and 
strategy.   
The goal of the megacommunity approach is provide a model of collective 
leadership that fully involves the three sectors, where no single person or group 
is in charge, but all benefit from addressing issues and the concomitant reduction 
in complexity that none can accomplish alone (Gerencser et al., 2008).  As 
defined by the authors: 
A megacommunity is a public sphere in which organizations from 
three sectors—business, government, and civil society—
deliberately join together around compelling issues of mutual 
importance, following a set of practices and principles that make it 
easier for them to achieve results without sacrificing their individual  
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goals.  We chose the term megacommunity to reflect such a 
sphere’s character as a gathering place, not of individuals, but of 
organizations. (Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 53) 
Although Gerencser et al., (2008), emphasize the role of organizations 
rather than individuals in their megacommunity approach, the involvement of 
individual leaders in guiding change for their own organizations, as well as the 
megacommunity as a whole, is critical.  Marcus, Dorn and Henderson (n.d.) see 
the key role of leaders as prompting organizational change that is more 
responsive—both in content and in timeliness—to critical issues than is often the 
case with organizational change.  Translated to cross-agency endeavors, a 
distinct subset of leaders are “metaleaders” that connect “the purposes and the 
work of different organizations or organizational units” to engender a “shared 
course of action and a commonality of purpose” (Marcus et al., n.d., p. 44).   
For multiagency efforts, metaleaders cannot rely on the authority inherent 
in the position they hold in their own agencies but instead must use their skill to 
“envision a sum that is larger than its parts and then find a way to communicate, 
inspire, and persuade broader participation” (Marcus et al., n.d., p. 44 [internal 
cite omitted]).  Marcus et al., (n.d.), however, recognize the personal sacrifices 
metaleaders must often make, as well as the difficulty that often attends joint 
efforts, particularly where, as is potentially the case for privacy standards, 
“shared purposes require sacrifice, the reduction of autonomy and 
independence, or a change in culture or operating procedures” or when “creating 
new relationships among traditionally competitive agencies” (Marcus et al., n.d., 
p. 45).  Clearly, metaleaders, a special breed of leader, are critical to the multi-
sector approach to developing uniform privacy protection standards. 
B. ADAPTATION OF THE CAPABILITIES-BASED PREPAREDNESS 
PROCESS 
In the process of setting privacy standards, the megacommunity to be 
involved should include every sector that is a part of the Information Sharing  
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Environment—federal, state, local and tribal governments, the private sector, and 
foreign partners—as well as stakeholders, or representatives of stakeholders, 
such as privacy advocacy groups. 
Known as the Capabilities-Based Preparedness Process, this approach—
discussed in more detail infra—“emphasizes collaboration to identify, achieve, 
and sustain target levels of capability that will contribute to enhancing overall 
national levels of preparedness” (National Preparedness Guidelines, 2007, p. 33; 
Guidelines).  The process emphasizes the early formation of an inclusive working 
group to “identify, analyze, and choose options” for filling an identified capability 
gap (Guidelines, 2007, p. 34).   
As suggested in the Guidelines (2007), membership in the working group 
should draw from a wide variety of organizations, including private sector and 
non-governmental organizations.  Although the Capabilities-Based Preparedness 
Process, as written, focuses on physical emergency response capabilities, this 
author believes that the robust collaborative aspects of the process would be 
useful as part of any strategic planning process where the voluntary collaboration 
of various stakeholder groups is required.  
There is no reason the process could not be applied to determine 
appropriate responses to gaps of a legal nature—such as determining the 
proposed ISE privacy standards to be adopted.  The benefit of applying the 
Process will have lasting impact—the collaborative effort needed to develop 
privacy protection standards will set the stage for future collaborative efforts as 





Figure 2.   Capabilities-based Preparedness Process (From National 
Preparedness Guidelines, 2007, Figure B-2). 
This capabilities-based process “emphasizes collaboration to identify, 
achieve, and sustain target levels of capability that will contribute to enhancing 
overall national levels of preparedness” (National Preparedness Guidelines, 
2007, p. 33; Guidelines).   
Broken into simple, discrete steps, the process could also be used to 
regularize and optimize development and implementation of a selected strategic 
policy.     
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In application, the first step would be to convene a working group.  As 
suggested in the Guidelines, membership in the working group should draw from 
a wide variety of organizations, including private sector and non-governmental 
organizations.  Having a wide range of membership will assist in the technology 
adoption process by helping ensure that future users of the system are fully 
informed of the program, thereby concomitantly decreasing resistance to the 
chosen strategy. 
One of the most critical steps would be next.  The working group would 
“identify, analyze, and choose options” for filling the identified capability gap—or 
in this case, privacy protection gap (Guidelines, 2007, p. 34).  Updating plans 
and strategies is the next step in the process and includes amending agency and 
joint work plans, along with budgeting considerations.  Allocating resources 
through reviews of funding sources and return maximization is followed by 
updating and executing program plans.  Another critical step, assessing and 
reporting, is the last step in the circular process, and is intended to provide a 
“continuously validated baseline for preparedness [or privacy protection]” to 
ensure that resources and capabilities remain in proper balance (Guidelines, 
2007, pp. 38). 
The capabilities-based process would thus lend itself to Bellavita’s counsel 
that strategic change in the complex homeland security environment requires 
working at the level of patterns that may require the benefit of a retrospective 
viewpoint for their innate coherence to become evident (2006).  In turn, working 
at the level of patterns requires establishing boundaries, promoting beneficial 
patterns, supporting desired patterns and intercepting incipient undesirable 
patterns (Bellavita, 2006). 
In summary, by successfully harnessing the value of megacommunities 
and metaleaders to address the complex issue of identifying appropriate privacy 
protections and ensuring the uniform and mandatory application of those 
protections to all members of the ISE, homeland security and the protection of 
individual rights and liberties can both be improved.  
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